

Bangladesh's hedging behavior with major powers and the question of joining the Quad

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Abstract

The research aims to identify the relationship between employee training, person-job fit and performance. The correlation between training and Job suitability has been the main concern of scholars and practitioners over the times. This paper presents a review of the relationship between training and performance and also examines the mediating role that quality of training may play in the relationship between these two. Literature suggests that training to a big extent is a determinant of employee performance. The review has also revealed the importance and purpose of training in organizations, and how it contributes to performance. The review so far, reveals a seeming consensus in the belief that there is a positive relationship between training and employee performance and also that training develops the skills, knowledge, abilities and competencies of the employees. In addition, Quality of training mediates the relationship between job fit and performance fit. Based on the review of past studies, this paper proposes the mediating role of person job fit in determining the indirect relationship that may exist between training and performance.

Keywords: Training, Person-Job Fit, Performance Mediation

INTRODUCTION:

Indo-Pacific maritime region plays crucial role in world trade and commerce with rising strategic ramifications. Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) in Indo-Pacific oceanic waters with major chokepoints classified as one of the most intensive maritime traffic zones. Bangladesh as a littoral state of Bay of Bengal is serving as springboard for improved bilateral and international cooperation.

The emergence of China and its assertive presence in the Indo-Pacific is obvious in the current context. Competition between China, the United States, and India manifests itself in a variety of ways. This includes growing intervention in the political affairs of Indian Ocean littoral states and increased militarization of the region (Boas Lieberherr, 2021). The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) of China has incited other significant Asian nations to fabricate new or grow existing organization projects (Chung, 2018; Li, 2020; Schulze and Blechinger-Talcott, 2019). Japan's Indo-Pacific Strategy for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific was declared in 2016. India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi has upgraded India's ten years old Look East approach to 'Act East' with an end goal to recharge the country's commitment to Southeast Asia. Simultaneously, the US International Development Finance Corporation was fanning out with practically no designs to get private interest in Asian new turn of events and framework projects. The Quadrilateral Security Dialog (Quad) apparently the latest

undertaking of the United States to make a gathered front to counter China's influence in the Indo-Pacific. In this overall condition, a new assertion by a Chinese high-ranking representative on Bangladesh joining the Quad has started another discussion. Bangladesh's foreign minister indicated that Bangladesh, as a sovereign country, has the right to make its own decisions. He also dismisses the likelihood of Bangladesh joining because the country has never been interested in a military alliance (M. M. Rahman, 2021). On the other hand, India made it clear that the expansion of the four-nation grouping was not discussed (*The Daily Star*, May 20, 2021). The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) was first established in 2007 by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. In 2017, senior authorities from four countries met in Manila, Philippines, for Japan's initiative. After this conference these grouping gains greater strategic importance in the Indo-Pacific region.

In response to geopolitical dynamics, multilateral methods such as the United States and Japan's 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific,' China's 'One Belt and One Road Initiative,' and India's Act East Policy, as well as the Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR), are gaining traction. In this situation, now the key questions are: how Bangladesh managing its strategic connections with its neighbors and big powers in the context of a contentious rivalry and strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific region? How Bangladesh is acting in order to accommodating present Indo-Pacific geopolitical competition? How the Quad might function in the Indo-Pacific? What effect will it have on the strategic environment of the area? How might Bangladesh go about considering joining the Quad? What options are available to Bangladesh?

The article is isolated into three segments excluding the introduction and concluding part. The theoretical underpinning of small state hedging behavior is presented in the first section. The second portion focuses on Bangladesh's strategic stance and hedging behavior with major powers and actor in the Indo-Pacific region. Third section deal with Bangladesh consideration for joining Quad and its limitations maintaining major powers. In the fifth section, the limits of Bangladesh as a small country are discussed and examined in relation to joining the Quad.

Theoretical Framework: Hedging of Small States

Strategic hedging is an underexplored, under-speculated concept in international relations literature. Analysts use the term to explain many scenarios in the process of major power struggle and the role of third parties. Small, rising, and powerful countries have all utilized strategic hedging as a third alternative (Boon, 2016; Koga, 2017; Tessman, 2012). Strategic hedging is a collection of policies that emphasize realist-style balancing on the one hand, and prioritize involvement and integration methods on the other. The hedging state interacts with the strong threatening state (PTS) to avoid threats or becoming involved in unbalanced disputes (soft balance). The term "hedging" was coined in the 1990s to describe state action that straddles the two obvious tactics of balancing and "bandwagoning," demonstrating mixed features of selective involvement, limited resistance, and partial submission. Despite the fact that hedging has been used for decades, it is still a contentious and misunderstood topic in politics and academics (Lake 1996; Green 1999; Goh, 2005, Johnston and Ross 1999). Different analysts have utilized the idea of "molding and supporting" ways to deal with managing the US's reaction to China's ascent in 2001 (Richard Weitz, 2001). Zhao Suisheng and Rosemary Foot, for instance, have portrayed help to portray or uncover the intrigues of US-China relations. Beijing's US strategy is a two-layered way of thinking of both "reliable and supporting" (Suisheng Zhao, 2012; Rosemary Foot, 2006). Even though more and more

studies have different ideas what supporting is, there is still no agreement on how supporting should be defined and used.

The term "hedge" is used to describe a conduct with three attributes: refusal to favor one side or be gotten into an inflexible arrangement, endeavors to seek after inverse or inconsistent measures to alleviate various dangers across areas, and longing to expand and develop a backup position. These distinctive attributes add to the "arrangement" writing by permitting researchers to isolate supporting from two very much talked about IR procedures: "adjusting" and "bandwagoning" (Waltz 1979; Walt 1985; Schweller 1994). Balancing and bandwagoning both involve: (i) a reasonable decision of one control over another; (ii) unambiguous, single-directional proportions of either countering a danger (on account of adjusting) or expanding benefits (as well as limiting misfortunes, on account of bandwagoning); and (iii) putting all policy eggs in the aligned power's basket. In these three perspectives, supporting contrasts from adjusting and bandwagoning. Supporting isn't simply a "center" position, yet additionally an "inverse" and "contingency plan" act, as the current supporting writing brings up. Hedging has also made an appearance in discussions about ASEAN nations' or smaller states' strategy toward superpowers.

Two scholars' work has been very useful in this regard. In an investigation of Southeast Asian local security methodologies, Evelyn Goh contends that the essential way of behaving of large ASEAN individuals is better characterized through the viewpoint of supporting than rebalancing or band wagoning. As per Goh, supporting is a bunch of strategies planned to stay away from (or get ready for) a situation where legislatures can't choose between additional reasonable choices like equilibrium, band wagoning, or lack of bias. This means an essential center ground that stays as unbiased as can be expected (with or against a major power). As indicated by Goh, Southeast Asian nations shield themselves from negative security circumstances by combining backhanded adjusting, commitment, and enormous power interweaving (Evelyn Goh, 2006). Kuik Cheng-Chwee presents a basic comparative contention, zeroed in on the particular states of Malaysia and Singapore. According to Kuik, hedging is a strategic compromise position between extreme bandwagoning and pure balancing. States use a combination of "risk-contingency and return-maximizing" options to hedge in this "betwixt and between" zone (Kuik Cheng-Chwee, 2008).

Bangladesh hedging with major powers:

In the Asia Pacific, hedging has become a significant term in the study of international politics. Bangladesh, a small state with limited resources, has been successfully implementing hedging in its foreign policy. In terms of population and geography, China and India are dominant over Bangladesh. Bangladesh's military expenditure and economy are little in contrast with those of India and China. The two nations' exports to Bangladesh far dwarf their imports, a reality that the media alludes to as proof of the nation's weakness (Huq, 1994, Ahamed, 2004). Bangladesh relies heavily on international trade, as well as foreign aid and loans. Its economic growth and integrity are fueled by massive remittances from the Middle East and other parts of the world. As a result of its large population living close to the coast, Bangladesh is eventually incapable to prevent the effects of climate change (Johannes Plagemann, 2021).

Bangladesh's post-independence foreign policy meets the expectations obtained from small-state theories in international relations in many ways. It has taken very pragmatic approach in its foreign policy making, taking into account the vulnerabilities of a small state in terms of internal and external influence. Bangladeshi

foreign policy, once acknowledged worldwide, centered on economic and developmental issues. (Ahmed, 2020). As a result, Bangladesh must establish close ties with all countries in order to receive assistance and support. Economic progress, export growth, foreign investment flow, rise in official development assistance (foreign aid) are some of the priorities that Bangladesh must be addressed.

Bangladesh's hedging with India and China

Bangladesh's foreign policy is not simply balance or bandwagon, but hedges on a regular basis. When the Awami League came to office in 2008, relations between Bangladesh and India improved dramatically. And Bangladesh's decision not to provide shelter to Indian insurgent groups (Chakma, 2019) won huge praise in New Delhi. Bangladesh's Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, for instance, upheld the BRI and the Free and Competitive Indo-Pacific Strategy. As indicated by the Bangladesh Bank's Statistics Department, Net FDI inflows from India and Japan to Bangladesh in 2019 were \$115.9 million and \$72.3 million, separately. The Chilahati-Haldibari rail link, the Dhaka-Siliguri rail link, and the Araihaazar Economic Zone are among the framework projects in Bangladesh that the two countries are interested in supporting. The Maitri Express was resurrected in 2008 after 43 years. The Chilahati Haldibari rail interface is the latest trans-line connection to be resurrected (*The Diplomat, January 4, 2021*). Bangladesh and India have signed a series of agreements aimed at boosting trade and energy ties, including the signing of a Framework of Understanding on Hydrocarbon Cooperation (*Financial Express, December 17, 2020*). Artificial intelligence (AI) and disaster management are among the new areas of coordinated effort being investigated by the two nations. Notwithstanding, there are still contentions among India and Bangladesh on subjects like the Teesta Agreement (Sreeparna Banerjee, *Pratnashree Basu, 2021*). Dhaka was the principal country to take cues from India and skip a scheduled SAARC meeting in Islamabad in 2016, despite Bangladesh's unwavering support for South Asian regionalism and commitment to international and regional cooperation. Bangladesh's step demonstrates the country's unwavering support for India's position in global politics and regional dynamics.

Although Bangladesh has had strong relations with India since its inception, Dhaka has surprised Indian policymakers on a number of occasions. Despite India's vehement objection, Bangladesh purchased two submarines from China for \$203 million in 2014 (*The Times of India, Nov. 14, 2016*). The country has had disputes with two of its neighbors, India and Myanmar over maritime boundary delimitation. And India was taken aback by Bangladesh's courageous decision to go to the United Nations for mitigation. Bangladesh has been awarded 19,467 square kilometers of the Bay of Bengal's 25,602-square-kilometer maritime area by an international court. This is the reason for Bangladesh to strengthen its defense capabilities ensuring security or any type of provocation in its maritime area. On the other hand, Bangladesh is upset by India's role in the Rohingya refugee crisis because, until early 2017, the Indian government refused to even acknowledge that there was a refugee crisis.

On the other side, the absolute worth of the transportation and power bargains between Bangladesh and China reached an untouched high of \$21.5 billion. The visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping brought about 27 agreements adding up to US\$ 24.45 billion. Amidst the worldwide COVID-19 pandemic, China stretched out some assistance to Bangladesh, conveying PPE and testing packs. Bangladesh has gotten 40,500 test units, 15,000 cautious N95 covers, 300,000 clinical shroud, 10,000 guarded outfits, and 1,000 infrared thermometers from China. On May 20, 2020,

Chinese President Xi Jinping and Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheik Hasina chatted on the telephone about the COVID-19 pandemic in Bangladesh. Xi Jinping guaranteed that China would assist Bangladesh, including sending a clinical expert with grouping (*Delwar Hossain and Shariful Islam, 2021*). Xi Jinping's significant state visit to Dhaka in 2016, which pronounced a "fundamental association" between the two nations, was trailed by Hasina's visit to India a year after the fact. During this state visit the two Prime Ministers certified that the connection among India and Bangladesh is manufactured through history, culture, and language and goes a long way past a fundamental relationship" (*Chowdhury, 2019*). This visit to India demonstrates Bangladesh's clear counterbalance to China's well-publicized visit. Bangladesh, then again, has kept deafeningly quiet on the Sino-Indian line conflicts in Doklam (2017) and Ladakh (2020), frustrating Indian policymakers.

As a matter of fact, China remained Bangladesh's essential wellspring of military preparation and gear in 2015, including credits, awards, and the exchange of two redesigned Chinese submarines (*Plagemann, 2021*). In any case, in Tokyo in 2019, Hasina straightforwardly upheld Japan's mission for a long-lasting seat on the UN Security Council, which Beijing goes against. Another fascinating issue is that of road construction. The Padma stream span, potentially Bangladesh's most troublesome framework project, started development in 2010. The World Bank withdrew its US \$1.2 billion support in 2012 amid claims of unprofessional conduct by state officials. China stepped in with almost \$3 billion in financing for a 6-kilometer road and train bridge connecting Bangladesh's north and south (*Stacey, 2018*). Bangladesh's capacity to operate in western export markets depends on improving port infrastructure. In 2010, China indicated that it would invest up to \$9 billion in Bangladesh's Chittagong port (*Shepard, 2016*). China vowed to help again when the port's inland region required building an entirely different remote ocean port. An agreement between China and Bangladesh's Chittagong Economic Cooperation and Development Commission (CHEC) was relied upon to be marked for the first time in 2010 (*Shepard, 2016*). A highway linking Myanmar and China was additionally remembered for the arrangement. It didn't work out, however, and an agreement with CHEC wasn't renewed in 2014. Dhaka's choice to forsake Sonadia port venture was motivated by tension from Japan, India, and the US (*Kayes, 2015*), as well as a Japanese proposition to construct a deep seaport in adjoining Matarbari. Dhaka's abandonment of Sonadia bargain a significant catastrophe for China's desires. In this continuous mentality of the relationship, Bangladesh has expected an equilibrium international strategy show one of the fundamental standards of pragmatism not to "Put all the eggs in a same basket". From this point of view Bangladesh has realized that it would not carry the luggage of history what China did in 1970's and not just depend on India for While a strategic cum economic close tie would benefit Bangladesh more in economically and help to resort pressure on India to be respectful on our rights of common resources.

Bangladesh's hedging with USA and Russia

Bangladesh and Russia celebrated their 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations on January 25, 2022. Friendship between the two countries has endured since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Currently, Russia is Bangladesh's foremost supplier of combat hardware and military gear for its armed forces. Bangladesh signed a \$1 billion contract with Russia to purchase military equipment and ammunition in 2013 (*Daily Star, January 16, 2013*). Orders for reinforced vehicles and infantry weapons, as well as air safeguard frameworks and Mi-17 vehicle helicopters were made. MoUs were

additionally inked between the two nations on collaboration in regions like agribusiness, general wellbeing, clinical science, education, counterterrorism, counterterrorism and more. As part of the accords, Russia agreed to provide \$500 million to the development of Rooppur, Bangladesh's first nuclear power station. "Bangladesh's 2,000-MW atomic power project, which got Russian monetary and specialized help, is a splendid illustration of our more noteworthy commitment," Sheik Hasina said (*Daily Star*, January 16, 2013). The power plant's construction began in 2016, and two units, each with a capacity of 1,200 megawatts, are planned to be finished by 2024. The first unit will be produced this year, with the second unit following in 2023. The energy area is one of Bangladesh's areas of coordinated effort with Russia. Petro Bangla has consented to bore ten gas wells with Russian energy behemoth Gazprom. Because of this, Bangladesh would have the option to produce 56 million cubic meters of gas each day. Both countries also enjoy healthy trade ties with Bangladesh exporting goods worth \$665.31 million to Russia and importing \$466.70 million. Aside from that, both countries have strong trading relations. According to official estimates, Dhaka-Moscow economic links grew even during the COVID-19 pandemic, with Bangladesh exporting \$665.31 million to Russia and importing \$466.70 million in fiscal year 2020-21 (*Shovon*, 2022).

Dhaka is caught between a rock and a hard place when it comes to managing its strategic connections with Russia and the United States. Recently for Bangladesh, one of the most consequential diplomatic dilemmas come after Russian invasion in Ukraine. On March 2, the United Nations General Assembly passed a milestone goal denouncing Russian "animosity against Ukraine" disregarding UN Charter Article 2 (4), and requiring a "prompt, complete, and unqualified" withdrawal of Russian military powers from Ukrainian domain to reaffirm Ukrainian sway and regional uprightness. The US-backed resolution to diplomatically condemn Putin's Russia as a pariah state on the international stage received 141 countries' approval. Bangladesh, along with its big neighbors India and China, was one of the 35 countries that abstained from voting (*bdnews24.com*, March 3, 2022). Dhaka's abstention at the UNGA is a careful balancing act in keeping with its intention to "stay neutral" and avoid "picking sides" in the face of the greater geopolitical polarization that Moscow's action is anticipated to create in the days ahead (*Shovon*, 2022). Bangladesh shifted from its previous position of unflinching support for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity at the UNGA, opting to abstain from voting due to strong economic and geopolitical ties with the United States. This stance reflects Bangladesh's intention to avoid enraging Russia and to project an image of goodwill and bilateral cooperation. On the other hand, a few weeks later, it reversed its position and voted in favor of Ukraine, demonstrating its great desire to keep relations between the United States steady and its allies.

Bilateral relations between Bangladesh and the United States have always shown both countries' determination to adapt to a changing global context. The shifting profile of Bangladesh-US relations reflects the growing geopolitical and geostrategic importance of South Asia in US strategies. Bangladesh's relations with the United States can be better understood by classifying them into two periods. Before and after the terrorist attack on the Twin Towers on September 11, 2001. The events of September 11th brought in a significant shift in US foreign policy goals for Bangladesh. Given the United States' declaration of a "War on Terror," Muslim countries' support became critical. As a result, Bangladesh, a moderate Muslim country, gained importance in US geopolitical calculations (*Shariful Islam*, 2018).

Bangladesh-US relations have seen significant changes since 9/11. The biggest joint practice between the US Marines and the Bangladesh Air Force occurred in 2007 Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) 1 was at the highest point of the plan at two-sided gatherings (Ahmed, 2007). Moreover, two American military commanders visited Bangladesh in March 2009 to reinforce reciprocal security participation and to give the security force help with combating psychological warfare (Daily Star, March 7, 2009). Following that, the US organization declared its goal to sign a TIFA with Bangladesh or lay out a US-Bangladesh Economic and Trade Cooperation Forum (UBETCF) to fortify the US-Bangladesh financial association (Daily Star, 19 February 2010). Bangladesh and the United States have a long-standing friendship. One of the strongest ties of friendship between the two is trade and investment. The total trade volume with the U.S. increased by 59.4 percent to USD 4.1 billion in 2009 from USD 1.5 billion in 1996. Bangladesh's exports to the United States totaled USD 6.8 billion in 2018-19 (AK Abdul Momen, 2021). Starting around 1971, the US government has given about \$5.8bn in development aid to Bangladesh. In 2011, USAID spent more than US \$180m in Bangladesh to upgrade individuals' vocations (The Daily Star, May 26, 2012). The United States' unwavering humanitarian and diplomatic assistance to Bangladesh in dealing with the Rohingya crisis has left a very positive impression on the Bangladeshi people and government.

In this cooperative atmosphere, Bangladesh not only cooperates, but also gives the United States the cold shoulder, demonstrating its hedging conduct in foreign relations. Despite years of requests from the US, Bangladesh has refused to sign the ACSA (Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement) and GSOMIA (General Security of Military Information Agreement) agreements (Mehjabin Bhanu, 2022). On the other hand, when the Chinese envoy to Bangladesh stated that Bangladesh should not join IPS, Bangladesh vehemently objected, stating that Bangladesh is capable of forming its own national policy.

The United States' recent bold step in support of Bangladesh's human rights and democracy raises concerns that the two countries' relations are deteriorating. The US Treasury and State Departments imposed sanctions on the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), a Bangladeshi special unit, for extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. Secondly, Bangladesh was also not invited to the United States' democracy summit in December 2021. In these deteriorating relations, Bangladeshi political analysts and policymakers are speculating about the future of the Bangladesh-US relationship. Recently US under-secretary for political affairs Victoria Nuland's visit in Bangladesh bears a tremendous implication for future structure of relations between two countries. According to US and Bangladesh officials, the Partnership Dialogue would cover all elements of the relationship, including trade, labor, investment, human rights, governance, global and regional problems such as climate change, the Indo-Pacific, and security cooperation. In the Bangladesh-US partnership meeting, Nuland made it plain that the US expected Bangladesh to stand by its side in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Bangladesh was forced to reverse its previous attitude on the Ukraine issue as a result of the United States' strong stance.

Joining the Quad: Consideration for Bangladesh

Bangladesh's policy on hedging with regional and extra-regional powers is shaped by some of the country's most fundamental policy considerations. With all of these agreements in place, the Indo-Pacific is becoming a point of dispute where Bangladesh sees it as a source of common economic resource. As a feature of its system to safeguard

itself, Bangladesh has said it is exceptionally able to participate in numerous global discussions on network, connectivity, energy collaboration, monetary turn of events, security collaboration, disaster management, etc. Bangladesh's support in global drives like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal Initiative (BBIN-EC), Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), and Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) has given the nation much-required foreign direct venture, energy, resources for the foundation of the project, as well as regional coordination and engagement strategies (*Abdur Rahman and Tarek H. Semul, 2020*).

Bangladesh, which has set an objective of changing from a Least Developed Country (LDC) to a Middle-Income Country (MIC) by 2024, has been a piece of ongoing local financial achievement. This goal and country's economic boom have been supported by rapid growth in the manufacturing sector, as well as a large infrastructural development effort, with annual GDP growth rates of no less than 6 percent during the last decade. Dhaka frantically needs a lot of FDI to broaden its product container as well as infrastructural improvement to keep up with this development and progress up the modern worth chain. Thus, any extraordinary battle for control or uplifted contention among global and local elements in the Indo-Pacific Region might hurt Bangladesh's turn of events. Bangladeshi authorities are gradually focusing on the more extended Indo-Pacific Sea environment and the Bay of Bengal's Sea Line of Communications (SLOC) as part of their necessary preparation. These ocean paths represent approximately 82 percent of Bangladesh's foreign exchange, which incorporates the commodity of instant pieces of clothing and the import of unrefined components, as well as raw petroleum and condensed flammable gas (LNG), which power the nation's flourishing assembling industry (*Karim, 2018*). Thus, any battle between nearby or worldwide gatherings along these ocean paths in the Indo-Pacific Region could hurt the country's objective of turning into a created country by 2041 and its security. As a result, Bangladesh expresses a clear desire to maintain a safe distance from this great power struggle, with no intention of balancing or bandwagoning. Bangladesh's approach to this great power competition is based on the country's history of neutrality in global affairs, as Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina put it: "Our foreign policy is very clear: good relations with everyone; what China and the US are doing, it is between them" (*Robinson, 2018*).

Secondly, Bangladesh has taken the policy to tame not to contain China- one of the major development partners of it. Following China's membership to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, the country's economy received a significant boost, as well as added value as a global stakeholder economically and diplomatically. As a result, China has developed quickly to become a great economic power and the United States' lone credible competitor, all while retaining its closed political structure. Some scholars have questioned why, in the post-Cold War era, there are no Asian governments balanced against a powerful China. Waltz, Kenneth N hypothesis says that as a neighboring state becomes more stable, its neighbors will either build up their armies or work together. Until the mid-2000s, be that as it may, scarcely no Asian nations had made vital developments against China.

Thirdly, Bangladesh's intrinsic worth to outside players expanded significantly, bolstering Dhaka's bargaining leverage (*Johannes Plagemann, 2021*). Bangladesh wields great power in the face of overpopulation, reliance on help, debts, and poverty. It's also considered a significant market with a growing middle class. Indeed, Dhaka's autonomy might be explained by "strong economic and budgetary

measures within the last few years" (IMF, 2020). Furthermore, Bangladesh's geographical location has been greatly revalued. All these factors benefited Bangladesh foreign policy. In Bangladesh, not in the least significant Asian powers and Western contributors have connections with them, yet Russia and the Gulf States have important stakes in development and so on. Because of this, the Bangladeshi government has more power to negotiate than it did in the past, when banking cartels and wealthy people from the West were in charge. To properly comprehend the benefits of multi-polarity for Bangladesh, it is necessary to examine the types of partners that have become available. If Bangladesh bend into a single side, then these benefits of multi-polarity could not be served. All things considered, a "popular consensus" for more grounded ties with China emerged, which was supported by a significant portion of Bangladesh's civil society, military, and press in addition to traditional ideological groupings (*Datta, 2020*). Japan has traditionally supported Bangladesh and wishes to collaborate with China to develop Asia's infrastructure (*Sasada, 2019*). These two factors benefited Dhaka.

Finally, a remark on big power rivalry' fury is required. There's been a lot of chatter in recent years about how the US-China relationship is deteriorating. However, India has grown increasingly antagonistic toward China, as seen by border incidents in 2017 and 2020. In this situation Bangladesh unlike the other members of the Quad, has no such strategic intentions or conventional security dilemma in the Bay of Bengal as a part of Indo-Pacific region. Furthermore, Bangladesh has no reason to stand against China, like other countries in the region that are preoccupied with their own strategic and geopolitical challenges. Bangladesh has never taken a provocative stance in its foreign affairs, and it lacks the strategic ambitions and challenges that the Quad states do. As a result, Bangladesh should take a pragmatic approach and place a greater emphasis on bilateral relations avoiding confrontation with any regional and global power. Bangladesh has always had friendly and cooperative relationships with the United States, India, Japan, and China, and it has always promised to fight terrorism, piracy, climate change, refugee crises, and other non-traditional security problems. On these problems, Bangladesh has a close working relationship with these countries. In the shake of maintaining this smooth cooperation with all stakeholders in this region Bangladesh should keep active participation with all major stakeholders in this region.

Bangladesh's limitations as a small state

Bangladesh's bargaining power may be limited in three ways. Consider the Rohingya refugee crisis, which is currently Bangladesh's most pressing foreign policy challenge. The nation has taken in nearly 1,000,000 Rohingya evacuees escaping Myanmar's fierce crackdown (*Hossain, 2020*). China has foiled UN Security Council activity on Myanmar's Rohingya issue a nation that, similar to Bangladesh, has followed an omni-directional international strategy (*Fiori and Passeri, 2015*). China's conciliating position in the Rohingya outcast emergency started ensuing from Beijing's recommendation for a three-adventure reply to address the troublesome. On November 19, 2017, China said that Beijing is thinking about its "three-stage plan" to come up with a "last and important plan".

Up to this point, New Delhi has not held Myanmar accountable for the crisis or accepted any responsibility for Myanmar's refugee intake. (*Johannes Plagemann, 2021*). India's lack of concern for the refugee situation stems from its belief that China should not be given the opportunity to improve relations with Myanmar. New Delhi will recall that they had previously opposed the military Junta in Myanmar, which strained

ties and allowed China to assume the role as Myanmar's most significant economic and political partner. Myanmar's growing symbolic importance, which, like Bangladesh, is a primary battleground for opposing connectivity initiatives, is a crucial factor in Bangladesh's vulnerability (Lanteigne, 2019).

Second, maintaining good relations with its neighbor India is currently under extreme pressure for Bangladesh. The relationship between Bangladesh and India is recognized as a "all-weather friendship," however there are also unresolved bilateral issues between the two countries, such as Teesta water sharing, border killings, and trade barriers. The Teesta River is Bangladesh's one of the important interests in developing mutually beneficial relationships with India. The importance of water to Dhaka was recognized in 2011 before then-Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's ceremonial visit. The struggle Dhaka is having to persuade New Delhi to accept a water-sharing agreement is part of a larger system of minor state flaws. Then again, West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee has a true denial because of India's organization governmental issues. After Banerjee took steps to pull her decision in favor of the alliance government in New Delhi, Singh traveled to Dhaka with basically nothing (Plagemann and Destradi, 2015). After the BJP took office, further attempts were made. However, due to Mamata Banerjee's veto, the water-sharing accord would not be implemented this time. Since then, reaching an agreement has become more difficult. Unlike the BJP, which is eager to gain ground in West Bengal, Banerjee has few incentives to help the center. Bangladesh's inability to reach a deal with its neighbor reveals one of the country's biggest shortcomings as a small country.

CONCLUSION

In an interview Michael Kugelman- the deputy director and a senior associate for South Asia at the Washington-based think tank Wilson Centre stated that, "US does not seek or expect to join the Quad. There are no plans to increase the number of Quad members at this time. If the group decides to expand, it will seek out new members from countries that share its desire to challenge Chinese hegemony. Quad states can take different posture not immediately adding members to the Quad, there may be a 'plus procedure' (Daily Star, March 20, 2022). The Quad states can take different posture not immediately adding members to the Quad, there may be a 'plus procedure'. As a result, they may launch a Quad+ initiative or something similar. Quad's ability to draw the other countries of the region together in this fashion will be a foresight decision as well as tactically important. Quad's future intentions aren't limited to ensuring the security of this region. They stay up with what's going on in the world. Their joint statement covers a variety of topics, including climate change and the equal distribution of the Covid-19 vaccination. In the post-Covid multilateral environment, these issues will be crucial for poor countries.

Quad's major goal is to limit Chinese influence in the region, which will inevitably lead to strategic disagreements. To counter these measures, China will continue to expand its sphere of influence. In reality, the Trans-Himalayan Multidimensional Connectivity Network conversation between China, Afghanistan, Nepal, and Pakistan has been dubbed the "Himalayan Quad" or a "counter-Quad." This geopolitical competition and countermeasures taken by the parties could lead a big conflict or war. If we look at the history of the First World War or other important regional conflicts, we can see how regional military and security alliances played a key role. The First World War was spurred by the alliance formed by Britain, France, the

Soviet Union, and its counter-alliance in Europe. When countries form a military alliance, a slew of concerns arise. Arms competition, atomic weapon development, state militarization, and other competing postures create a cloud on the sky. These kinds of alliances increase regional vulnerability and obstruct the peaceful environment needed for economic growth and investment.

Mahathir Mohamad, former prime minister of Malaysia said at Nikkei's Future of Asia conference, the Quad "is an old encirclement technique in which you try to encircle the adversary, but the adversary would respond," (NIKKEI Asia, 20 May, 2021) he also stated that "Please remember, Japan went to the Second World War because the Americans denied Japan access to oil," he said. "It's the same for China." Therefore, there are many speculations and debate persist on Quad and its actual motive. Analysts and scholars are split on this, but one thing they all agree on is that this organization was founded to stifle China's increasing sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific. As a result, this type of grouping could enhance the likelihood of an arms race, rapid militarization, and the exercise of power, in this region all of which could obstruct the peaceful atmosphere and potential growth and development environment. Bangladesh, like the rest of the region, must be exceedingly cautious when it comes to Quad and similar initiatives. It must act in its own best interests, using pragmatic diplomacy and preserving as much balance as feasible. Bangladesh should not join the Quad or any other one-sided coalition at this time. For the interest of regional stability and to strengthen its position in bilateral geopolitics, Bangladesh has no choice but to maintain strategic neutrality.

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