

The Central African Crisis: Causes, Solutions and Prospect - A Diplomatic Perspective

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Abstract

Since its independence, the Central African Republic (CAR) has been plagued by chronic political instability and administrative inefficiency ever since it gained its freedom. As the situation became direr, the villages that were pillaged formed their own militias, setting the scenario for a simmering sectarian conflict between Christians and Muslims. The security situation in the Central African Republic (CAR) is deteriorating and the humanitarian crisis is deepening. The war in the Central African Republic has to be understood in the historical context of the nation since, for centuries, the country has been a centre of exploitation by a variety of different foreign players. People who have been seeking to understand the scope and scale of violence that has taken place in the Central African Republic over the course of the past two years have cited a variety of social grievances that centre on the political manipulation of religion, belonging, and access to opportunities. This study was carried out to examine the crisis of Central African Republic (CAR), investigating the causes, solutions and prospect from a diplomatic perspective while reviewing the geographical and historical basis of CAR, examining the evolution and growth of the crisis, investigating the causes of the crisis, identifying the actors and their roles in the crisis, investigating the attempts at resolving the crisis and submitting the prospects for the crisis.

Keywords: African, Causes, Crises, Diplomatic, Perspective, Prospect, Solutions

INTRODUCTION

The current state of humanity is experiencing a number of grave crises, whether on the economic, social, or environmental fronts; however, the most devastating crises are those on the security front, which lead to never-ending wars that claim the lives of thousands of people each year and force millions of others to flee their homes (Khaled & Tevhide, 2018). Recent crises have put the political leadership and risk managers of many countries to the test. These crises were frequently brought on by unanticipated or unforeseeable events, but they were also brought on by weak links and interruptions in information flow. The modern crises, with its almost irreversible impacts, does not recognise or respect national borders; rather, it thrives on fragmentation and variation (Baubion, 2013). Nonetheless, finding solutions to crises has proven to be one of the most difficult methods, particularly given that various crises require unique approaches. For example, Thucydides documented a crisis that led to the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta. This crisis resulted in the war (431–404BC). During the Greek and Roman ages, effective crisis management depended heavily on the factors that are linked with the significance of direct communication, interaction, and dialogue with the public opinion. In light of recent developments and the need to

maintain stability, this strategy is not viable in the context of the ongoing international crisis.

Morten Boas explains in the policy briefing he wrote in 2014 that the political instability and administrative fragility of the Central African Republic (CAR) have been constant characteristics of the country ever since it gained its independence. The history of a collapse that was therefore predicted can be seen here (Morten, 2014). This demonstrates that conflicts and crises do not emerge out of nowhere in any community; rather, their origins are to be found in the past (Khaled & Tevhide, 2018). In light of the fact that the protracted conflict and security situation in the Central African Republic (CAR) are getting worse and the humanitarian catastrophe is getting worse, it is necessary to find an appropriate strategy to address the dilemma. The crisis has continued to reappear on the list of worldwide crises in the 21st century, in spite of the many efforts and attempts that have been made to resolve it. In light of this, the purpose of this study is to propose a strategy and method for resolving the crisis.

The Central African Republic, also known as CAR, has not garnered much attention on the international stage. Few people have been there, and even fewer are familiar with the country outside of the stereotype that it has one of the world's lowest standards of living and one of the most corrupt administrations. In spite of this, during the past several months, things have taken an unexpected turn for the better, and the Central African Republic (CAR) has managed to attract more attention from all over the world than at any other point in its history as an independent nation. This is because of a variety of contributing factors. There are some things in life that are entirely dependent on chance. The conflict in the Central African Republic (CAR) merely took the place of the wars in Mali and the Sahel as the most pressing issue on the African continent until the news from South Sudan brought attention to Juba. Others have to do with the fact that worldwide public awareness of the Sahel and the nations surrounding it has been substantially increased as a result of the crisis in Mali and the attack on the petrol plant in In Amenas. Both of these events took place in In Amenas. This can be seen as both a good and a horrible thing. Due to the fact that the tragic situation of the people living in the CAR has been ignored for several decades, it is extremely encouraging that the international community has recently begun to pay attention to it. When the international community rushes into a country and a situation about which few people have in-depth knowledge, there is a risk that interventions made in an effort to find a quick answer to a political as well as a humanitarian crisis are made on the premise that the Central African Republic and its conflicts are based on assumptions that may or may not necessarily correlate to what the current unrest is all about. This is a risk that exists when the international community rushes into a country and a situation about which At the present time, neither genocide nor a full-fledged sectarian conflict can be described as taking place. It is possible to avert continued sectarian warfare as well as subsequent huge levels of killing; however, doing so will require careful preparation, patience, and financial resources. The state is so fragile that there is nothing to build on, and the existing condition of affairs is so dangerous that extreme caution must be exercised while engaging in any form of external action in order to avoid fanning the already smouldering but as of yet unlit sectarian fire (Boas, 2014).

The Central African Republic is a country that cannot be reached by sea and is entirely surrounded by land. From at least 8,000 years ago, there have been permanent settlements of people in the area that is now known as the Central African Republic. The Aka (Pygmy) people, who were most likely the initial inhabitants of the

country, make their homes in the forested areas of the country's western and southern regions. The slave kingdom of Dar al-Kuti maintained control over the northern territories of the Central African Republic until the latter half of the 19th century, when these regions were eventually brought under the rule of the French colonial government. Once the country gained its independence in 1960, political strife persisted as a direct result of the bias shown by colonial rulers for particular ethnic groups over others. After periods of civil unrest and dictatorial rule, including the notorious regime of the self-styled Emperor Bokassa I (who renamed the nation the Central African Empire), the nation started down the path towards democracy. However, this path was threatened at the end of the 20th century by interethnic civil war in neighbouring countries as well as by attempted coups d'état. People in this country frequently make reference to a proverb that goes, "When elephants fight, the grass suffers; when elephants make love, the grass still suffers," because they are sick of the social unsteadiness and the shifting allegiances among competing segments of the power elite (Boas, 2014). The proverb goes as follows: "When elephants fight, the grass suffers; when elephants make love, the grass still suffers."

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Since its independence, the Central African Republic (CAR) has been plagued by chronic political instability and administrative inefficiency ever since it gained its freedom. This is the history of a collapse that had been predicted, hence. When Michel Djotodia pulled together the Séléka alliance, he may have done so with the best of intentions. The problem, however, was that the only thing that kept the alliance together was the desire to remove Francois Bozizé from power. The internal coherence of the coalition collapsed after Bozizé's departure for unknown reasons. As a result, given the absence of any other viable options, the members of the alliance continued to depend their livelihoods on pillaging. As the situation became more dire, the villages who were pillaged formed their own militias, setting the scenario for a simmering sectarian conflict between Christians and Muslims. Law and order are expected to be restored by international forces in the midst of this cacophony of communal violence. The most difficult obstacle, on the other hand, is figuring out how to avoid pouring fuel to the flames of sectarian tension. Any attempt at disarming militias must be done so with this reality in mind, and the international troops have a responsibility to proceed with extreme caution. The events that have taken place and those that are still taking place are unfortunate, but they do not constitute genocide or a full-scale sectarian battle.

As a result, the difficulty that this study faces is answering crucial questions about the crisis in the Central African Republic (CAR). There is a need to know what triggered the crisis, how it has been managed since 2013, and the solution that has been found so far using diplomatic views. This study examines several publications that have been done in the past on the progression and worsening of the issue, as well as the various solutions that have been proposed.

AIM AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The aim of this study is to examine the crisis of Central African Republic (CAR), investigating the causes, solutions and prospect from a diplomatic perspective.

The specific objectives are to:

- i. Review the geographical and historical basis of CAR;
- ii. Examine the evolution and growth of the crisis;
- iii. Investigates the causes of the crisis;
- iv. Identify the actors and their roles in the crisis;
- v. Investigate the attempts at resolving the crisis and
- vi. Submit the prospects for the crisis.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

It would be beneficial to both international peace and security, as well as the prevention of future crises in the Central African Republic (CAR) and other countries around the world, to investigate the causes of the crisis in the Central African Republic (CAR), as well as possible solutions to the problem and possible outcomes of the situation. Researchers would gain a complete grasp of the cause of the crisis, which would help them better prepare for any future crises, if they looked at how the crisis developed and grew through time.

An examination of the geographical and historical foundations of CAR would provide fresh perspective on the nation that is the subject of this study. To acquire a better understanding of the role that diplomatic relations play in the resolution of crises, it is helpful to be familiar with the factors that led to the escalation of the situation, as well as the many players who have been involved and what roles they have played.

It is essential to conduct research on the efforts that have been made to resolve the crisis in order to raise awareness and appreciation for the efforts of the system and practise of conflict resolution.

Furthermore, providing a prospect for the crisis and helping future leaders plan the development of strategy to maintain peaceful coexistence in the country would be of great assistance.

SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The study covers the crisis in CAR, and internal and external participation. It covers the crisis up till 2013 when there was a landmark event in the crisis.

GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (CAR)

Central African Republic (CAR) is one of the least recognised nations in the world; it is a country of many diverse ethnic languages and groupings, with a complicated past and lively cultures. Internal forces, intra-African issues, and foreign factors have all had an impact on the nation's economy, diplomacy, politics, agriculture, and health care and education systems. These variables continue to provide the nation with a myriad of difficulties. Cultures are always changing, and some of these shifts are quite easy to see, while others are more subtle and need some extra effort to decipher. Indeed, there are conflicts that arise between "old" and "modern" methods, despite the fact that these are not even tangible categories. People who lament the passing of ancient traditions may occasionally be romanticising the past, or they may just be pining away for simpler times. Change, on the other hand, is unavoidable, and Central Africans are reacting to it in ways that are suitable for them, or, in some circumstances, in the only ways that

they can. Traditions and traditions continue to exist, change with the times, and eventually die out when no longer practised. Centraficans have a great understanding of their past, and although they do look to it for insight into how to navigate both the present and the future, they do not become bogged down by it. From its earliest days to the present, the topography, peoples, languages, and religions of the CAR have all had an impact on its history; in the current day, there is both continuity and change in the CAR's cultures and practises.



Figure 1: Map of CAR
Source: (Dukhan, 2016).

The 3.8 million people that make up the population of the Central African Republic are dispersed throughout an area that is more than 622,000 square kilometres (more than 240,156 square miles), making it a country with one of the lowest population densities on the planet. The western region of the country is home to approximately two-thirds of the country's total population, while the majority of the remaining residents call the central region their home. The remaining territory of the country is extremely sparsely populated, with a density of fewer than thirty-seven people per square kilometre (37 square miles). The Gbaya make up 33% of the population, followed by the Banda (27%), the Mania (NIandja, Nlandjia) 13%, the Sara 10%, the Mboum 7%, the Yakoma 4%, and the Biaka (Baaka, Aka) 4%. Other significant ethnic groups are the Sara 10%, the Mboum 7%, and the Yakoma 4%. There are a great number of minor groupings, like the Zande. Some people, such as the Gbaya-Manza, join tribes due of their physical closeness to one another as well as the linguistic and cultural commonalities between the two groups (Dukhan, 2016).

In contrast to what the colonisers imagined, ethnic groupings were not hermetically walled societies; rather, there was and still is a significant degree of fluidity in the process of identifying one's ethnicity. People from the same ethnic group tend to be united by the fact that they speak the same language, have the same ancestry, and practise the same culture. Languages, cultures, and practises have not remained unchanged throughout time; rather, they have evolved in reaction to both internal and external causes. These changes may have been brought about by a variety of circumstances, including inter-marriage, assimilation, as well as lineage, geography, lifestyle (method of production), and inter-marriage. There has been a recent upward trend in the number of ethnic conflicts in Bangui between groups that are based on their political allegiance. A great number of people place the responsibility for these

wars on military revolutions. In the present day, newer districts on the city's periphery are often only populated by a single ethnic community (Woodfork, 2006).

Farmers make up a significant portion of the Central African population; examples of such people are the Banda, who inhabit savanna regions. While many Mbororo people now engage in mixed agricultural practises, there are still some nomad pastoralists living along the drier border with Chad. Although though they are free to wander during the dry season, these pastoralists are increasingly finding that they must remain in close proximity to their lands in order to fight off encroachers. Riverine people, such as the Yakoma, earn their livelihood from the commerce that occurs along the Oubangui and other rivers. These peoples were the first to come into touch with Europeans and were also the ones most likely to obtain an education in the Western tradition.

The sprawling metropolis of Bangui, the capital of the Central African Republic, was founded in 1889 by the French as a commercial town on the banks of the Ubangi River. Bangui was considered one of the most charming cities in the equatorial region of Africa during the times of colonial rule. The city is comprised of forested hills and lush meadows in addition to densely populated shantytowns, a charming but now somewhat run-down city centre, and contemporary residential areas. Bangui boasts a lively nightlife and a strong musical culture, in spite of the fact that strikes and curfews often force the city to come to a halt. Bangui is located in the Central African Republic (Morten, 2014).

The Central African Republic is roughly the same size as France and is bounded to the north by Chad, to the east and north by Sudan and South Sudan, to the south by the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Kinshasa), to the west by Cameroon, and to the south by the Republic of the Congo. To the south, the Central African Republic is bounded to the south by the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville). The Ubangi River, which is a tributary of the Congo River, serves as the southern boundary of the nation, and the city of Bangui serves as the country's capital. Along a crest that descends from southwest to northeast, the enormous rolling plateau that makes up the primary drainage divide between the basins of the Congo River and Lake Chad can be found in the Central African Republic. This plateau is located in the country of the Central African Republic. The whole of the country is traversed by a number of rivers. The streams that feed into the Chari River make up the northern portion of this country. The remaining two-thirds of the terrain's drainage in the south is collected by the Ubangi River, which serves as the southern border between the Central African Republic and Congo (Kinshasa).

Wide central plains gradually rise to the Tondou Massif in the east and the Bongos (Bongo) Massif in the northeast, both of which reach heights of 1,330 metres (4,360 feet) at Mount Toussoro. Mount Toussoro is the highest point in the country. After reaching Mount Ngaoui, the highest point in the country at an elevation of about 4,625 feet (1,410 metres), they make the ascent into the high granite range of the Karre Mountains in the west, and then they drop eastward into sandstone plateaus. The Dar Challa range, which includes Mount Ngaya, which is located close to the Sudanese border and has an elevation of 4,350 feet (1,326 metres), is home to the most significant mountains in the northern region. There is a plain in the southeast that is crossed by a number of rivers (Dukhan, 2016).

In the north, the climate is characterised by a humid savanna, but in the south, an equatorial forest zone is the predominant biome. During the wet season, which begins in March and lasts until October or November, there is a high probability

of heavy downpours virtually every day, as well as regular morning fog. During the months of August and September, the higher Ubangi region receives the highest annual precipitation, which amounts to 71 inches (1,800 mm), while the Karre Mountains get 59 inches on average (1,500 mm). At this time of year, the daily temperature ranges from 66 to 86 degrees Fahrenheit (19 to 30 degrees Celsius) with southwestern monsoon winds (winds that bring rain) (Woodfork, 2006).

The dry season, which normally begins in October and continues until February or March, is brought on by the harmattan trade winds, which blow from the northeast. The temperature fluctuates from 64 to 104 degrees Fahrenheit (18 to 40 degrees Celsius), and although it is pleasant during the day, the evenings are considerably chillier. The atmosphere is arid. In most cases, there won't be any clouds in the sky. Sand and dust storms are possible in the far northern regions. The people that live in the Central African Republic are made up of a variety of different groups. Some, like the Zande and the Nzakara, are state-forming tribes, while others, like the Aka, are forest pygmies who live by hunting and gathering. Before the arrival of European settlers in the late 19th century, the borders between different groups were more fluid than they are now. A significant number of individuals associated with their own clan rather than with a greater ethnic group. Yet, there were also exchanges with people who spoke a variety of languages and followed a range of cultural traditions. Conflict and enslavement were widespread, as were peaceful commercial transactions and unions between people of different faiths (Woodfork, 2006).

The attempts of colonial administrations and ethnographers to classify Central Africans into discrete ethnic groups have never been fruitful and have been unsuccessful throughout history. Yet, the French conquerors of Central Africa did foster a multiplicity of ethnic groups and regional identities among their people. The French had a role in the establishment of an elite group, which eventually became the indigenous governing group for the whole of the nation and has held the majority of governmental posts ever since the country gained its independence. Those living in southern riverine areas, such as the Ngbaka (Mbaka), Yakoma, and Ubangi, contributed to the formation of this elite group. The increased importance of regional relations has contributed to the complexity of this political environment. The greater population of Central Africans who live outside of riverine areas has a propensity to despise this predicament and has, on occasion, taken it upon themselves to undertake leadership roles. Despite the fact that northern parts of the country have had more political influence since the country's independence, Southerners continue to play a key role in national politics (Morten, 2014).

LITERATURE REVIEW

The overall coordination of an organization's response to a crisis in an efficient and timely manner, with the goal of avoiding or minimising damage to the organization's profitability, reputation, or ability to operate, is what is referred to as crisis management (CM). This type of management frequently necessitates the need to make quick decisions on the basis of uncertain or incomplete information (Merriam Webster, 2016). In the pre-crisis stage, there are three substages: signal detection, prevention, and preparedness for the crisis. If a crisis has been identified up to this point, steps should be taken to head it off at the pass and contingency plans should be made for its management. The objective is to lessen the likelihood of the occurrence of a crisis while simultaneously increasing readiness on both a strategic and a tactical level. In this

regard, action-wise, it is anticipated that the organisation, at this point, will have a crisis management plan that is kept constantly updated. The organisation puts together a group to handle the issue, chooses a spokesman or spokespersons, and begins formulating draughts of emergency statements (Khaled & Tevhide, 2018).

The crisis stage itself is the second stage, and this stage is comprised by two substages, which are the crisis recognition stage and the crisis containment stage respectively. At this point, the manner in which an organisation responds to a crisis scenario, how it communicates with various stakeholders, and overall how it handles a crisis are all extremely essential. This stage involves the organization's response to what has actually happened: the crisis management plan is put into action, and the literature proposes three principles which are to be rapid, to be accurate, and to be consistent. Assistance from public relations is extensively scrutinised at this point since they produce the messages that are going to be communicated to all of the stakeholder groups, making sure that the protection of the general public is the primary focus. The organisation will make efforts to restore the damage that has been done to it as a result of the incident.

The post-crisis stage begins once the crisis itself has been resolved. At this point, the organisation will assess how effectively they managed the problem. Their primary objective is to strengthen their preparedness for possible emergencies. Even though the crisis isn't as urgent as it was earlier, the organisation is continuously monitoring the news as well as the actions of various stakeholder groups. It is essential to have a solid grasp on how their various stakeholder groups see things. In the body of literature on crisis management, a variety of alternative crisis management process models are proposed. On the other hand, in comparison to those models, our three-phase model is an easier one to understand (Khaled & Tevhide, 2018).

- ***Conceptual Review***

The historical narrative of The Central African Republic is one of the topics included in Birmingham and Martin's (1983) book, which also covers other historical topics. According to the academic division of Africa, Birmingham and Martin's Central Africa may be found to the east of Ajayi and Crowder, to the north of Wilson and Thompson, to the west of Oliver, Matthew, and others, and south of the Sahara. Cameroun, Gabon, and the Central African Republic are located in the region's north-western corner, while Malawi, Zimbabwe, and the Central African Republic are located in the region's south-eastern corner. In point of fact, the writers were successful in beautifully revealing a portion of the continent that continues to be mostly uncharted territory in English-speaking nations in the western hemisphere, as well as in Africa itself (Birmingham and Martins, 1983). In addition to general historical records, topics such as ecology and medical history were discussed in this book, which had contributions from a balanced combination of researchers in the middle of their careers and seasoned experts. The pre-colonial history of the Central African Republic is detailed in the book, which was written and published before the crisis that is the subject of this research. Yet, this contributes to a clearer articulation of this paper's points.

According to Beninga, Manga, and Mogba (2018), the Central African Republic has been plagued by recurrent socio-political upheavals ever since the untimely passing of its country's founder, Barthélémy Boganda, in the year before to the nation's attainment of its independence (Beninga, Manga, & Mogba, 2018). Their research, on the other hand, takes into account the actors of instability in the Central African Republic's crisis, including their interests, motives, and capacity to act or cause

harm, as well as the dynamics of the conflict in the Republic, including the factors that keep the crisis going, such as the internal vulnerability of the country, the fragmentation of armed groups, and the worsening of intercommunity tensions, among other things. In their suggestion, they outline the duties that the government would play to allow it to re-establish state authority throughout the country, as well as the roles that political parties would play in relation to civil society, the international community, and the African community (Beninga, Manga, & Mogba, 2018). These proposals are still not sufficient enough to resolve the situation, which is why the current effort was made.

Despite the peaceful democratic transition in 2016 and the election of a new President as well as the presence of MINUSCA since 2014.

Amelie (2018) notes that the security situation in the Central African Republic (CAR) is deteriorating and the humanitarian crisis is deepening. This is the case despite the fact that MINUSCA has been present in the country since 2014. According to him, the situation is still unstable and unsafe, and there are frequent assaults on civilians, including targeted and indiscriminate strikes on humanitarian actors. He also claims that the situation is becoming worse. Possibly because the humanitarian needs are so great, with more than half of the population, or 2.5 million people, in need of protection and basic amenities, he focused his emphasis on how the international communities are responding to these demands. Because of his efforts, there is a growing awareness of the need of expanding access to meet the needs of those who have been displaced, and he saw the possibility that this might lead to an escalation of the issue (Amelie, 2018). His assessment was accurate due to the fact that the crisis continued beyond the year in which it was published.

Backdating the chronology of the crisis to the 10th of December, 2012, Dukhan, (2016) explains that the Seleka, a coalition of rebel groups from the north of the Central African Republic (CAR), launched a major armed offensive from the northeast of the country against the Bozizé regime, and heavily armed mercenaries from Chad and Sudan supported the attack. This was the beginning of the crisis. He further explained that the loss of legitimacy of political elites who have been co-opted by foreign actors has been the driving force behind the decades-long succession of coups that have taken place in the nation (historically by the French and more recently by regional actors, particularly Chad). He mentioned that many observers have called for international support to help strengthen the national justice system, to develop the capacity to effectively investigate and prosecute human rights violations. He added that this support is needed to help strengthen the capacity to investigate and prosecute human rights violations. In order to find a solution to the problem, he said that eradicating the culture of impunity that is prevalent at the moment and implementing an efficient programme of transitional justice could be able to make a significant contribution to the process of healing and achieving peace.

According to Knoope and Buchanan-Clarke (2020), the war in the Central African Republic has to be understood in the historical context of the nation since, for centuries, the country has been a centre of exploitation by a variety of different foreign players. Specifically (Knoope & Buchanan-Clarke, 2020). They claim that prior to the arrival of French colonists in the CAR around the year 1885, the territory was ruled by sultans who were tied to commercial and social networks that extended throughout the Sahara. The region became a haven for both slave traffickers who supplied the Saharan and Nile River slave routes and refugee groups escaping from these invaders. These slave traders provided the slave routes across the region. They are thus of the opinion

that the issue facing the nation can be traced back to past events and would be more effectively resolved via historical methods (Knoope & Buchanan-Clarke, 2020). But, the nation as it is right now has a number of circumstances that are generally recognised as being prerequisites to the development and propagation of violent extremism. In addition, the remedy is insufficient to completely eliminate the problem.

According to Khaled and Tevhide (2018), the fundamental and modern concepts related to crisis management, particularly in the field of communication, share some similarities with what was practised in ancient civilizations. One of these similarities is the importance of direct contact between the leadership and the public. Another similarity is that there are some similarities between what is practised today and what was practised in the past. The accurate diagnosis of the true causes of the crisis, the prohibition of the dissemination of false news, and the reassuring of the public opinion that there is a solution to the crisis, a sound management decision, and a good plan for its implementation are some other similarities that exist between the two situations. As a result, drawing parallels between the crises of the recent past and those of the present day gives a comparative framework. The history of crises presented by the authors demonstrates to us that the study of crisis management cannot be linked to a particular civilization or era. This is especially true when taking into account the fact that humanity has been exposed to multiple and complex environmental, political, economic, and military crises. This is true for the catastrophe that is occurring right now.

Morten (2014) demonstrates an interest in comprehending a history of conflict in the Central African Republic, a history which he saw as a history of a collapse which had been anticipated. According to his point of view, political instability and administrative weakness have been the hallmarks of the Central African Republic (CAR) ever since it gained its independence from France. The difficulty was that the only thing that held the Séléka coalition together was the desire to get rid of Francois Bozizé. Michel Djotodia may have had noble intentions when he put together the Séléka alliance; nevertheless, the problem was that this desire was the only thing that kept it together. The internal cohesion of the alliance collapsed after Bozizé's departure for unknown reasons. After identifying the primary issue, he went on to say that the primary difficulty is figuring out how to stop giving more gasoline to the sectarian fire. His hope rested on the involvement of the world community, which was a severe expectation. Despite this, his research does not provide a solution to the problem.

As we get closer to the middle of the first decade of the new century, Bruce (2004) observed that an increasing number of citizens and leaders are becoming aware of the shifting nature and ongoing presence of crises in our midst. These crises can be on any level, including the local, national, transnational, or international levels. He is of the opinion that a common vocabulary that can be used when talking about crises and crisis management has started to develop, despite the fact that there is no widespread agreement over a specific approach to conceptualising or investigating crises. Nonetheless, he believes that international governance is unlikely to contain the solutions to the issues that are confronting national governments. In light of these flaws and restrictions, he recommends a different strategy for resolving crises, particularly the sort of crisis that is the focus of this particular research.

Baubion (2013) examine and evaluate practises of crisis management, so contributing to the identification of good practise in crisis management. They stress the shifting nature of the crisis environment. An overall crisis governance framework, the role of science and expertise, leadership issues, the governance of networks, and

international cooperation are the five topics that he identifies as key cross-cutting public governance issues that should receive attention from crisis management policies and practises. The expansion of this network's thoughts to worldwide cooperation to assist crisis management is one of the potential next steps for the activity of this network. Another possibility involves the development of a knowledge centre on crisis management. The fairly narrow extent of their attention is directed on management.

According to John (2003), it seems that we live in a culture that is becoming more technologically advanced and fast-paced, and as a result, people may be less connected with their families and other good influences than they were in the past. Hence, experts working in mental health need to be prepared to assist society in coping with crises of this kind, and counselling psychologists are especially well equipped for the sort of intervention that is being proposed here. He made a big deal out of the fact that counselling psychologists are especially adept at fostering self-improvement among those who are generally in good health, which is the case in many different types of emergency circumstances. In addition to this, the abilities of counselling psychologists, which include the ability to apply short, problem-solving, developmental, educational, and self-empowering intervention techniques, are a good fit for the field of crisis intervention (John, 2003). This suggestion appears to make sense in light of the present predicament.

The article by Samman (2015) provides a theoretical addition to the literatures on crises written by constructivists and cultural political economy scholars. Yet, despite the fact that these new methods have shed light on the fictitious aspects of crises, they have failed to take into account the uniquely historical forms of imagination that are used when events are understood and created as crises. In particular, they have not yet clearly theorised how the memory of previous crises can interact with attempts to diagnose and find a solution to a crisis in some later present. As a response to the crisis theory, he came up with an innovative set of methods for analysing the meta-historical aspects of the crisis. These include a typology that identifies three distinct ways of recalling past crises and a concept called "history-production," which captures how different interpretive practises contribute to the diagnosis and negotiation of crisis episodes. In addition, there is a typology that identifies three distinct ways of recalling current crises. When taken as a whole, these tools help shed light not just on the intricate connection between historical parallels, narratives, and lessons, but also on the relationship between these representational modes and the imagined aspects of crises.

In its edited volume, *Historical Dictionary of the Central African Republic*, Pierre (2005) investigated the history of CAR and included other fascinating facts about the country. According to him, one cannot help but be astonished by the quantity of material that is supplied, particularly the 1,200 dictionary entries that were gathered by the writers. This is especially true when one considers the tiny size and relative insignificance of the CAR. When examined more closely, it is clear that the bulk of them, around two thirds of them, are autobiographical in nature. It would seem that nearly no prominent individual, particularly politicians or bureaucrats, from either the colonial or post-colonial era is ignored. This is the case for both time periods. The collection is nearly as much of a biographical dictionary of the CAR as it is a larger work, despite the fact that many of the entries are, quite naturally, fairly short. This is not to imply that consideration of other issues is lacking. There are further entries for significant locations and ethnic groups, as well as political parties and groupings, major events, and noteworthy groupings. Even while there is a decent amount of material

devoted to major issues, some readers may feel that a better balance might have been struck between biographical and more general articles. For instance, the item on the Economy takes up just one page, whereas the one on education occupies less than two pages. Also covered in fewer than two pages is the sector of agriculture that is responsible for well over half of the gross domestic product in the nation. Considering the recent conflict that at least partially has its roots in the religious divide between the Christian majority (for which there is no separate entry "Christianity") and the Muslim minority (for which there is an entry Islam at just over one page), it is disappointing to find that the entry on Religion is of a similar length. Despite the fact that there are some gaps in the subject coverage, this is an exceptional piece of work; nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind that these gaps are merely relative in relation to the thorough biographical treatment.

According to Lombard and Batianga-Kinzi (2015), people who have been seeking to understand the scope and scale of violence that has taken place in the Central African Republic over the course of the past two years have cited a variety of social grievances that centre on the political manipulation of religion, belonging, and access to opportunities. These people have cited these grievances in an effort to understand why the violence has taken place. This article contends that the violence must be understood in the context of social practises of violence that long predate the war, particularly in light of the diffuse and non-centralized mode of organisation through which the ongoing war has played out. Without denying that these factors have played a role, the article argues that this understanding is necessary in order to make sense of the violence. Lombard and Batianga-Kinzi (2015) focused their research on the prevalence of popular punishment and vengeance, which have long histories as components of statecraft in the Central African Republic (CAR), and have become even more widespread in the midst of the generalised insecurity and anomie that have set in over the course of the past few decades. The writers gave evidence of the workings of popular punishment in both rural and urban settings, beginning at the level of the immediate family and progressing upwards to that of the crowd and quartier. People have significant qualms about the use of popular punishment, but at the same time, they see revenge as a crucial instrument for establishing a limited kind of empathy and a baseline for acceptable social behaviour. These experiences in the CAR suggest that those who wish to understand how wartime mobilisation occurs must consider not only fighters' grievances but also people's conceptions of the practical and symbolic efficacy of vengeance and popular punishment as elements of politics and the management of threats. Specifically, these experiences suggest that those who wish to understand how wartime mobilisation occurs must consider fighters' conceptions of the practical and symbolic efficacy of vengeance and popular punishment as elements of politics.

Debos (2008) investigates a pattern of the regional conflict in Darfur, Chad, and the Central African Republic that has received little attention: the operations of militants with shifting allegiances that take place across borders. The journeys of Chadian "ex-liberators" in the Central African Republic (CAR), which have received very little documentation, are used to highlight the mobility of armed individuals around the area. The author describes how jobless Chadian troops were recruited to fight with Francois Bozize in the Central African Republic (CAR), as well as why many of those soldiers joined other armed organisations after Bozize took control of the country. The reconversions of armed combatants, who are able to easily switch allegiances and cross borders to carry on with their 'politico-military careers,' is therefore a structural characteristic of the current conflict, which has major

implications both at the local and transnational levels. This conflict is characterised by its structural characteristics. The author arrives to the conclusion that the author thinks the trajectories of freelancing military entrepreneurs are essential in understanding the development of this regional issue.

In the Central African Republic (CAR), the Séléka revolt that occurred on March 24, 2003 did not surprise observers who were familiar with the turbulent history of this nation, according to Kah (2013). He said that ever since the Central African Republic gained its formal independence from France in August of 1960, the country has been plagued with instability throughout the majority of its existence. The spread of small guns and light weapons, the contest for leadership among the elite and other forces, and the development of armed groups are some of the factors that have contributed to the ungovernability of the nation. He investigates the thinking that went into the Séléka uprising in 2013, which took place against the backdrop of unmet promises and a struggle for leadership in a nation that is well-known for having significant levels of internal strife. It would seem that this coalition of several armed organisations working for a variety of goals is unable to maintain security in this nation, since the situation in the country remains precarious. Yet, he does not provide a solution to the issue that we are now facing.

According to Tomolya (2014), the Central African Republic is a nation that is situated in the middle of Africa and is completely surrounded by land. The self-proclaimed "Emperor," Jean-Bédél Bokassa, governed the country for the most of the time after it gained its independence from France in 1960. The country is located in the centre of the African continent and is surrounded by seven other nations. After it, there was a string of coups, and power was regularly transferred from one person to another. Although having a population of just 4.6 million people, the nation is famously difficult to control due to the presence of more than 80 distinct ethnic groups, a mix of Christians, Muslims, and adherents of traditional religions, and a large number of indigenous languages. It has large quantities of gold, diamonds, and uranium, as well as enormous troves of lumber; nonetheless, it is among the poorest countries on Earth, lying only seven places from the bottom of the UN's human development index. This is despite the fact that the country also has vast troves of timber. The larger populace of the nation has not been able to reap the advantages of the country's potential wealth due to chronic bad governance and the absence of a functioning state. Tomolya (2014) said that the conflict in the Central African Republic (CAR) is not related to religion and that it is neither a jihad nor a crusade. She stated that the conflict is about power. The capital city of Bangui is at stake in the fighting in the Central African Republic (CAR), which is fought for political authority and money. Yet, he does not provide a solution to the issue that we are now facing.

Carayannis and Fowlis (2017) investigate the roles that the United Nations and the African Union (AU) play in the Central African Republic (CAR). This country has a protracted history of multiple attempts at conflict resolution that have been alternately supervised by the international community and the region. According to Carayannis and Fowlis (2017), the Central African Republic (CAR) has been a laboratory for peace interventions – a 'early adopter' of various peace initiatives. Since the mid-1990s, the CAR has been the host of nearly a dozen peacekeeping and peace building efforts. As a result, it is a helpful instance from which to make early conclusions regarding the responsibilities that should be played by the United Nations (UN) and regional organisations in the process of settling conflicts that include whole regions. The African Union, regional economic communities (RECs) like the Economic

Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and regional leaders have all played important roles throughout the many initiatives that have been undertaken in an effort to resolve the conflict in the Central African Republic (CAR). They begin their investigation with the dispatch of an inter-African monitoring team in 1997 and go backwards to examine the reactions and relationships between the many organisations and people involved. It has been suggested that the Central African Republic's (CAR's) peacekeeping operations have not had a clear political strategy, a clear grasp of the situation, as well as the requisite persistent participation from both regional and international players. It is further argued that each subsequent intervention has added an additional layer to the previous one, thus creating a proliferation of peace operations whose mandates, troop contingents, and leadership have not always been fit for purpose. This is due to the fact that each subsequent intervention has added an additional layer to the previous one. On the other hand, it does not provide any potential answers to the situation.

According to Berg (2008), the conflict in Darfur, which is located in western Sudan, has been a source of concern for the general public ever since it began to escalate in the fall of 2003. This is because the conflict has resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths, millions of displaced people, and continuous violence against the civilian population. Movements of refugees and attacks across borders have also brought attention to adjacent regions in the north-eastern part of the Central African Republic and the eastern part of Chad. As the year 2005 came to a close, there has been a significant worsening in the security situation in that region, which the vast majority of analysts view to be a territorial spill over from the violence in Darfur. Yet, this perspective does not well explain the problems that have broken out in the countries that are next to Darfur, which were already far from being calm before the crisis in Darfur began. Since earning their independence from French colonial authority in the 1960s, both Chad and the Central African Republic have been mired in a state of turmoil almost nonstop. Both countries are now experiencing a refugee crisis. According to the author, what can now be seen in the border regions of the three countries is not the extension of one conflict, but rather the increasing intertwining of three individual conflicts, each with its own causes and history, into a highly complex crisis system. This is something that can be observed as a result of the author's claims. This was just a surface-level investigation of the situation.

Denisova and Kostelyanets (2019) examine the dynamics of the conflict that began in the Central African Republic (CAR) in 2012 and continues to this day, as well as the motivations and interests of the conflict's main participants, the rebel coalitions Seleka and Antibalaka. The conflict began in 2012 and continues to this day in the Central African Republic (CAR). The writers analyse the relevance of the political, socioeconomic, and religious elements that have had a role in the development of behaviour and techniques used by these two groups. The so-called "economy of war," which swiftly evolved as a result of the political crisis in the CAR, is given a lot of focus in this article. The authors observe that despite the fact that the rise to power of President F.-A. Touadera in 2016 signalled the beginning of a new phase of the war that was less violent, political instability in the nation continues to exist, and the level of interfaith tensions remains at a high level. A high degree of impunity is still a severe concern, and the absence of accountability for crimes that have been committed continues to foster mistrust of the government among the general population. They note that in the context of Africa, conflicts typically begin at the highest level, between groupings of political elites, and only later affect the ordinary populace. This is

something that is emphasised by them. The writers did not go into more detail on the predicament or the potential remedies.

According to Diatta (2021), the Central African Republic is still battling difficulties in establishing itself as a state despite the fact that it has been independent for sixty years. According to him, despite numerous efforts to stabilise it, the nation is still caught in the vicious cycle of violence that started in late 2012, despite the fact that there have been many attempts to stabilise it. The Political Accord for Peace and Reconciliation in 2019 is put in jeopardy if there is a violent backlash against the outcome of the elections in December 2020. To put an end to the vicious cycle of violence and instability, a fresh strategy is required. Recent assaults by armed groups are proof that the security situation in the Central African Republic (CAR) is still in a perilous state, despite the fact that significant steps towards peace have been taken since 2013. They made the observation that essential aspects of the 2019 Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation have not been implemented, and that the agreement cannot be maintained under the present conditions. Since the signing of the deal, armed groups have committed several breaches, which is proof that they are not committed to the principles of the agreement. This does not bode well for a return to peace and stability in the region. The great bulk of the land is still under the authority of armed groups, who are responsible for the collection of taxes in the areas they govern. The distribution of military power has shifted significantly. Create a comprehensive strategy to deal with the internal political, security, and socioeconomic challenges, then fund it, put it into action, and monitor its progress. Participants at the national level: Maintain the construction of state institutions that are robust and self-sufficient, with the goal of providing representation for all of the country's residents while placing national interests ahead of personal ones. Union de l'Afrique africaine and the area of Central Africa In addition, the current research benefits from the contributions made by this publication.

Weyns, et al. (2014) made an effort to shed light on the present dynamics and provide an explanation for the motivations that lie behind the activities of the anti-balaka militias and the Seleka. It is based on material obtained during three separate research excursions to the Central African Republic (CAR) and countries that are nearby, substantial review of existing sources, and a comprehensive study of a series of interactive maps. In this section, the author discusses the Seleka as well as the anti-balaka militia organisations. After going through their history and organisational structure, we go on to provide a chronological breakdown of their activities and behaviour. After that, an examination of the political, economic, and religious motivations of both types of militia members is carried out. The participation of both tribes, but particularly the Seleka, in the mining industry of the Central African Republic is thoroughly explored in this article. They also talk about the effects and interests of neighbouring nations in the ongoing crisis in the Central African Republic (CAR).

Mehler (2012) opined that the true contribution of the state's security forces to the physical protection of African residents has received very little attention. According to him, there are regular allegations that security personnel are contributing to a general feeling of unease. He claims that the protectors have turned into the violators, and their presence has caused dread rather than security. In all honesty, the attainment of better security forces appears to be an unreachable objective in a good number of the crisis-stricken countries in Africa. This may be the case for one of two reasons: either violent conflicts have not been definitively resolved, and as a result,

decent reform is not possible; or a lack of capacity as a result of material constraints is difficult to remedy. Above all else, there is often a lack of political will on the part of governments to change their security forces, particularly the makeup and organisation of such forces. The provision of security by official troops in Liberia and the Central African Republic is compared in this article. These two countries represent two extreme situations of robust and limited international participation, respectively, in post-conflict security-sector reform. According to his argument, the blueprint models for such changes that do not take into consideration the expectations and experiences of the local community are doomed to fail. On the other hand, the essay is missing certain vital particulars that the current research would be able to provide.

According to Brown and Zahar (2015), social cohesiveness is increasingly being championed as a strategy that may be used in the process of peace building. They believe the idea to have been connected with attempts to combat inequality and to generate social capital, although this is only a theoretical connection. In spite of this, social cohesiveness is often cited as an essential factor in achieving long-term peace in post-war countries and regions, such as the Central African Republic (CAR). This is despite the fact that there is no empirical evidence to support this notion. The authors contend that peace building researchers put more emphasis on social cohesiveness as an end goal than they do on the parts of the notion that deal with the formulation of policies and their actual implementation. After their analysis of two significant social cohesion efforts in CAR, the authors conclude that practitioners are equally negligent in thinking about process. Both of the communities that are participating in the efforts are also having trouble understanding the intricacy of the horizontal and vertical links that are helping to maintain the conflict and that need to be reorganised in order to strengthen social cohesion. The authors compiled a list of these deficiencies and offered some suggestions for moving ahead. The present thesis will be expanded upon by this new investigation.

According to Suganami (1997), war is a multi-causal phenomenon, not only in the sense that a variety of factors contribute to the making of a war, as is commonly noted, but also in the sense that there are a variety of causal pathways that can lead to war, which is perhaps a less obvious interpretation of the term. So, there are some individuals who are convinced that the only examination of the causes of war that is intellectually credible is that which investigates the specific roots of the many conflicts that have occurred in the past. Yet even one of those who are inclined to be more homothetic has admitted, despite the fact that there are some voices that disagree, that "the hope that there are a few essential criteria that must always be present in order for war to occur is probably not going to be realised." Misperception, internal instability, and the "cult of the offensive," to mention just a few examples, are all variables that are often thought to be contributing causes of war. Nevertheless, these factors are not sufficient by themselves, nor are they even essential, to bring about a conflict. To the extent that these factors are believed to have been necessary components in the initiation of certain wars in the course of human history, they must be regarded as having been only contingently so. There are a great many contingent factors that can result in war, and there are very few necessary elements.

According to the opinion of Grimmelt (2007), a crisis is a sudden event or set of circumstances that threatens the environment, the health, safety, and well-being of employees, customers, or the general public in general. A crisis could significantly affect an organization's ability to carry out its business, that damages an organization's reputation, and/or that threatens the organization's ability to carry out its business. A

precarious situation has the potential to deteriorate into a catastrophe or disaster if it is not addressed in an adequate and timely manner as well as if it is not addressed at all. Crises are considered to be unfavourable shifts in the state of things regarding security, economics, politics, society, or the environment, and they are believed to be crises when they come suddenly, with little or no warning. He further explained that crisis management (CM) is the overall coordination of an organization's response to a crisis in an efficient and timely manner, with the goal of avoiding or minimising damage to the organization's profitability, reputation, or ability to operate. CM frequently involves the necessity to make quick decisions on the basis of uncertain or incomplete information. This concept, on the other hand, is exclusive to organisations and does not apply to countries.

- ***Theoretical Review***

According to Zamoum and Gorpe (2018), the fundamental and modern concepts related to crisis management, particularly in the field of communication, share some similarities with what was practised in ancient civilizations. One of these similarities is the importance of direct contact between the leadership and the public. Another similarity is that both of these concepts originated in the field of communication. The accurate diagnosis of the true causes of the crisis, the prohibition of the dissemination of false news, and the reassuring of the public opinion that there is a solution to the crisis, a sound management decision, and a good plan for its implementation are some other similarities that exist between the two situations. They provide a framework for comparison between the crises that occurred in the past and those that are occurring now. According to them, the history of crises tends to show us that the study of crisis management cannot be linked to a specific civilization or era, particularly when humanity has witnessed multiple and complex environmental, political, economic, and military crises. This is especially true when taking into account the fact that crises have occurred throughout history. In addition, the origins of many of the contemporary world's most intractable problems may be traced back to earlier eras. As a consequence, many of the geopolitical issues that are occurring in the modern day are the outcome of historical causes. However, the study of crisis management from an academic point of view should be a multifaceted analysis, including historical, cultural, and anthropological ones, which determines the course of evolution and consequences of the crisis. This is because the course of evolution and consequences of the crisis are determined by how the crisis is managed. The modern human race is currently experiencing a number of serious crises, whether on the economic, social, or environmental fronts; however, the security crises that lead to endless wars are the most devastating crises, as they cause thousands of deaths annually and force millions of people to flee their homes. In point of fact, the majority of those destructive conflicts could be avoided if the parties involved embraced wisdom by putting common interests ahead of their own desires, and choosing patience and dialogue over stubbornness and extremism, in particular when conflicts and crises do not build nations or civilizations, but rather destroy everything instead. The current crisis in the Central African Republic (CAR) brings up new problems that need to be solved, and the theoretical frameworks that have been produced by a variety of researchers may not be suitable to handle these problems.

The ethical component of crisis management is, however, one of the most important aspects that have been highlighted in recent research. This is due to the fact that researchers are aware that the ethical component is essential to the process of

rebuilding a positive mental image as well as regaining the confidence of the public opinion. It seems that the continuous issue in today's stakeholders' communication study and practise is the need of engaging in ethical communication while a crisis is taking place.

According to Coldwell (2015), recent financial and corporate crises have frequently highlighted the dearth of ethical and responsible leadership conduct in high positions. A crisis should be managed in an ethical manner, and decision-makers who understand the needs of a diverse range of stakeholders as part of their strategic decision-making will make more ethical decisions during a time of crisis because they can better incorporate those stakeholders' perspectives into their deliberations. Integrity and morality provide a rock-solid base upon which to build a genuine preventative and risk management strategy, which may then be adapted for use by contemporary crisis management tactics. By "this way" we imply the use of amnesty and being flexible. This is the best method for solving crises, since it by-passes the intra-conflicts that produce a worse atmosphere and is thus the most effective method. In order to successfully handle a crisis, a business has to be transparent and credible. If a firm lies or acts secretive during a crisis, the public will lose faith in them and it will be much more difficult for them to rebuild that trust. When it comes to the long run, stating the truth will almost always be beneficial. When communicating information, news, or thoughts to others, it is important to adhere to a method that is both stringent and clear, whether you are utilising conventional or digital forms of media. This is an essential component of truthiness. A great number of crises get their start with a rumour, erroneous information, or a piece of news that has not been validated, and so on. Due to the fact that freedom of expression is contingent upon a certain level of accountability, those responsible for the dissemination of false information are both the sources and the media (Coldwell, 2015).

According to Pashakhanlou, A. H. (2018), structural realism or neorealism attempts to explain international relations on the basis of the structural stresses that are created by anarchy. Kenneth Waltz, the most prominent advocate of defensive realism, and John Mearsheimer, the most influential advocate of offensive realism, both maintain that their respective theories continue to be the most effective lenses for understanding international politics in the world that has emerged from the Cold War. Both men are known for their work in the field of realism. The amount of authority that governments need in these circumstances is, however, something that structural realists tend to evaluate quite differently. As a result of this rationale, neorealism is sometimes split into two sub branches, which are known as defensive and offensive realism. The theory of defensive realism maintains that individual nations ought to amass the level of strength that is essential for their own flourishing. But, in their pursuit to become hegemonies, they shouldn't try to maximise the relative strength they now possess. A behaviour like this is considered to be unproductive since it would encourage the building of a coalition of their opponents, which will weaken their position. On the other hand, offensive realism contends that nations ought to strive maximise their relative strength in order to become hegemonies if they are in a position to do so and if the chance presents itself. According to this point of view, the best way for states to ensure their continued existence is to maintain a majority of power. Research on international crises and conflicts has also made use of this theoretical framework.

A potentially unavoidable presupposition not just in the field of psychology research but also in everyday conversations about the mind and behaviour,

behaviourism elevates the importance of behavioural evidence. It is used to monitor how individuals behave in tense situations like the one that is occurring right now. There is a clear distinction between the three groups of claims. In addition, when seen separately, each component contributes to the formation of a certain kind of behaviourism. Behaviorism that takes a "methodological" approach is dedicated to the scientific study of (1). The "psychological" behaviourist perspective is one that is dedicated to the reality of (2). "Analytical" behaviourism, which is also known as "philosophical" or "logical" behaviourism, is committed to the truth of the substatement in (3) that mental terms or concepts can and should be translated into behavioural concepts. This belief is at the heart of "analytical" behaviorism's theoretical foundation (Graham, 2000).

A normative theory regarding the scientific practise of psychology, methodological behaviourism is also known as methodological positivism. It asserts that the field of psychology should concentrate on studying the behaviours of organisms (human and nonhuman animals). The field of psychology should not be concerned with mental states or occurrences, nor should it attempt to create theories of how the brain processes information in relation to behaviour. According to methodological behaviourism, making reference to mental states, such as the beliefs or wants of an animal, contributes nothing to what psychology can and should learn about the origins of behaviour and does not add anything to what psychology already knows. Given the need for secrecy in scientific research, mental states cannot be considered legitimate subjects of empirical investigation since they are private things. John Watson's publications mostly centre on the philosophical movement known as methodological behaviourism (1878–1958). Within the field of psychology, the research programme known as psychological behaviourism may be found. It asserts that it can explain human and animal behaviour in terms of external physical stimuli, reactions, learning histories, and (for some kinds of behaviour) reinforcements. This theory was developed by B.F. Skinner. Ivan Pavlov (1849–1936), Edward Thorndike (1874–1949), and John B. Watson all contributed to the development of psychological behaviourism in their own bodies of work. Its most complete and significant manifestation is seen in the work that B. F. Skinner did on schedules of reinforcement (Graham, 2000).

To provide an example, picture a ravenous rat confined inside a laboratory setting. If a certain action, such as pushing a lever while a light is on, is followed by the provision of food, then the chance of the rat pressing the lever once again when it is hungry and the light is on is raised. These kinds of presents are called reinforcements, these kinds of lights are called stimuli (for discrimination), these kinds of lever presses are called reactions, and these kinds of trials or connections are called learning histories. The phrase "analytical behaviourism" refers to a school of thought within the discipline of philosophy that examines the "meaning or semantics of mental words or ideas" (Dennett, 2005). According to this theory, the basic concept of a mental state or condition is nothing more than the notion of a behavioural disposition or family of behavioural inclinations. These tendencies are shown in the way a person acts in one circumstance as opposed to another. When we declare that someone has a certain belief, for instance, we are not claiming that they are experiencing a certain mental state or condition in themselves at that time. Instead, we are describing the individual in terms of the potential behaviours that they may do in a variety of settings or in response to certain environmental interactions. Analytical behaviourism may be seen in the work of Gilbert Ryle (1900–76) as well as in the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–51), even if Wittgenstein's interpretation of his own work has been the subject of some

interpretational debate. More recently, the philosopher and psychologist U. T. Place (1924-2000) advocated a brand of analytical behaviourism that was restricted to intentional or representational states of mind. These states of mind include beliefs, which Place took to constitute a type, although not the only type, of mentality. Place was a proponent of analytical behaviourism. Daniel Dennett's work on the ascription of states of consciousness using a process he calls "heterophenomenology" contains, one might argue, a kind of analytical or logical behaviourism as well. This can be found in Dennett's work on the ascription of states of consciousness (Dennett, 2005).

In the process of building a theory of international politics, Waltz (1988) said that neorealism maintains the essential ideas of *realpolitik*; nevertheless, methods and objectives, as well as causes and consequences, are regarded differently in neorealism. For example, Morgenthau conceived of the "rational" politician as always working for the accumulation of an increasing amount of power. He regarded power as an aim in itself. Morgenthau claimed that even while he accepted that countries sometimes behave out of purposes other than power, such acts are not political in character despite the fact that he admitted that nations sometimes act out of factors other than power. Neorealism, on the other hand, considers power to be a potentially helpful tool, arguing that nations put themselves in danger when they have either too little or too much of it (Waltz, 1988). Extreme weakness might make it easier for an opponent to initiate an assault that they would have been discouraged from launching had they been stronger. When confronted with a dominating state's overwhelming might, other governments may feel compelled to strengthen their own military capabilities and collaborate on an offensive strategy. Since power is a method that may be helpful, wise statesmen strive to have an appropriate quantity of it. But, when it comes to matters of critical importance, the overarching concern of nations is not for power but for safety. This is a significant change that was made. A reorganisation of the causal connections is an even more significant change that was made. The many components of every world are capable of being arranged in a limitless number of configurations. The realist view holds that there is only one route in which causes may flow, and that is from the actions and interactions of persons and states to the results that those actions and interactions create. Morgenthau recognised that when there is competition for scarce goods and no one to serve as arbiter, a struggle for power will ensue among the competitors, and that as a result, the struggle for power can be explained without reference to the evil that is born in men. This was an important realisation for Morgenthau. The fight for power originates simply from the fact that men want things; it is not due to the fact that man's aspirations are inherently wicked (Morris, 2004).

Traditional realism explains things on a unitary level, whereas neorealism asserts that in order to understand international politics, one must first take into account the influence that structure has on things. Neorealism, which places an emphasis on how structures influence actions and results, rejects the idea that man's intrinsic desire for power is a sufficient cause of conflict in the absence of any other factor by arguing instead that structures play an important role. It rethinks the causal relationship between interacting units and the results at the international level (Morris, 2004). According to the logic of international politics, one is required to believe that some causes of international outcomes are the result of interactions at the unit level. Furthermore, due to the fact that variations in presumed causes do not correspond very closely to variations in observed outcomes, one is required to also assume that others are located at the structural level. Since the causes at the level of units interact with those at the level of structure, an explanation that focuses only on

the level of units is likely to be deceptive because of this interaction. If a strategy is capable of taking into account the causes at both the unit level and the structural level, then it is able to accommodate both the changes and the continuities that take place within a system (House, 1991).

According to Mearsheimer's (2007) interpretation, structural realism paints a holistic picture of international politics by presenting component units in accordance with the way in which they are arranged. For the sake of formulating a theory, states are shown as unified actors with the goal of surviving at the very least, and they are considered to represent the component parts of the system. Anarchy, defined here as the lack of a centralised monopoly of justifiable force, is the fundamentally important structural characteristic of the system. Variations in the number of great powers may result in structural shifts, and as a consequence, changes to the system. The supposed motivation of the units and the structure of the system within which they behave may be used to infer the range of outcomes that might be anticipated. Instead of focusing on factors operating at the national level, a systems theory of international politics is concerned with those operating on a global scale. Just as a market theory does not entail or need a theory of the business, so does an international-political theory imply or require a theory of foreign policy.

Systems theories are theories that describe how the structure of a domain serves as a limiting and disposing force on the interacting units that are contained within it. Systems theories may either be political or economic in nature (Fine, 2002). These types of theories provide information on the forces that the units are exposed to. From these, we may make some assumptions about the predicted behaviour and destiny of the units, specifically about how they will have to compete with one another and adapt to one another in order for them to live and prosper (Waltz, 1988).

According to the opinions of Quinn and Gibson (2017), a reductionist approach holds that in order to understand the whole, one must first understand the characteristics of the components and the relationships between them. It is a reductionist strategy to try to explain the behaviour of a group by doing psychological research on its individual members, and it is also a reductionist approach to try to comprehend international politics by researching national bureaucrats and bureaucratic systems. The previously popular quest to comprehend organisms by deconstructing them and employing physical and chemical knowledge and procedures in the analysis of its pieces is perhaps the best example of reductionism. So, it is essential to the reductionist approach that the whole be understood via the study of the pieces that constitute it. It is very uncommon for a reductionist to find oneself resorting to the techniques used in other academic fields in order to get a better understanding of his own subject area. One cannot know in advance whether or not reduction will be sufficient. Examining the subject matter that has to be explained and taking note of the outcomes must be done in order to provide an adequate response to the sufficiency inquiry.

Lazar (2017), on the other hand, is of the opinion that ever since the publication of Michael Walzer's *Just and Unjust Wars* in 1977, a "traditionalist" stance has dominated thinking about the morality of war in universities, military academies, and international legal circles. Lazar (2017) bases this opinion on the fact that Michael Walzer's book was the first book to examine the morality of war. Its primary responsibility is to provide ethical bases for the application of international law to situations including armed conflict: One of three reasons—national defence, defence of other states, or intervention to prevent acts that would shock the moral conscience of

mankind—is the sole justification for states—and only states—to wage war. Civilians are not supposed to be the targets of military operations, but it is morally acceptable for combatants to aim their weapons at one another, regardless of the cause they are fighting for. This is true even when doing so will inevitably cause harm to some civilians, so long as the level of harm is not excessive.

Since, for the first time, persistent analytical focus has been brought to bear on the ethics of war, this orthodox theory of just war has been put to demanding criticism during the last two decades. This attention to the ethics of war is a first. Traditionalist theory has had practically all of its findings overturned by analytical philosophers, which means that traditionalist theory's sustained appeal outside of philosophy departments is now matched by its contentiousness inside such departments. The term "revisionist" applies to a significant portion of these doubters. They have (a) questioned the legitimacy of national defence and the moral standing of states in general; (b) advocated for expanded permissions for military intervention; (c) called into question the immunity of civilians; and (d) argued that combatants fighting for wrongful aims are incapable of doing anything right other than laying down their weapons (Lazar, 2017).

According to O'Neill (1994), the "realist" worldview is the one that predominates in Western theories of international relations. In this scenario, the "actors" are assumed to be nations, each of which is looking out for its own national interests in a chaotic globe. In order to protect themselves from the ever-present risk of subjugation, they want power. But, since power in a competitive system is defined in relation to that of other states, it is impossible to establish power that is both mutual and definitive. Cooperation of any significant kind is either impossible or, according to "neorealists," exceedingly difficult to achieve. Alternatives to realism hold a greater expectation of cooperation than realism does, and this can be attributed to the growth of international institutions and interdependence (traditional idealism), the imposition of order by a dominant power (hegemonic stability theory), the common interests of subregions (regional integration theory), standards of international behaviour (regime theory), or transnational class interests (Marxist structuralism) (O'Neill, 1994). Traditional idealism is the alternative that holds the greatest hope for cooperation.

One of the most fundamental tenets of realism is the idea of power in relation to the structure of the international system, and one model for this idea is Selten and Mayberry's (1968). They hypothesise that there are two nations, each of which produces weapons with linear costs and divides a reward pot in proportion to the percentage of the overall military power that each nation has. It is possible that the award will include political compliance on the part of the opponent or from foreign nations.

According to a particular interpretation of Nash's bargaining theory, Brito and Intriligator (1985) propose that countries should spend money on arms in order to enhance their proportional share of the global pie. The presence of these arsenals raises the likelihood of conflict. Standard bargaining theory was revised by Shapley and Aumann (1977) in such a way that threats carry a cost that is not refundable, such as the amount of money spent on weaponry. Brito and Intriligator (1985) propose nations that commit themselves to a retaliatory strategy to be applied in the second period in order to cause a redistribution of commodities in the first period. This is done in order to achieve the goal of the authors' original hypothesis. Matsubara (1989) conducts a theoretical examination of international power using the same framework.

Zellerman (1961) and the writers of Zellerman (1961) address the efforts of major nations to expand their spheres of influence in the Third World via differential

games. Mares (1988) examines how a major power might coerce a medium one, focusing on the United States' conflict with Argentina during the Second World War and Mexico in the decades that followed. A recurrent PD model of an economic boycott against South Africa is presented in Spandau (1978). The Seven Weeks War of 1866 is used as an example in Bueno de Mesquita's (1990) study, which investigates how conflicts alter the hegemony pattern in the international system. It is possible, in accordance with the realist perspective, to explain the essence of international relations by treating nations as the primary players and seeing them as unitary entities. Achen (1988) outlines the requirements that must be met in a state's decision-making process for the state to behave as if it has a utility function. This is the case despite the fact that the state's actions are being dictated by competing domestic groups. The conventional wisdom in international relations (IR) is that game theory is inherently realist-oriented since it portrays governments as the participants and assumes that their decisions are logical.

Rosenau (1971) is one author who writes that "The external behaviour called for in game-theoretic models, for example, presumes rational decision-makers who are impervious to the need to placate their domestic opponents or, indeed, to any influences other than the strategic requisites of responding to adversaries abroad." On the other hand, one may mention studies that place an emphasis on internal factions or that depict governments as behaving counter to their rational interests. The administrations, electorates, and military-industrial complexes of both the United States and the Soviet Union are the six participants in the coalitional game that Brito and Intriligator (1980) propose. Although it is impossible for the two military-industrial complexes to conspire directly with one another, they are skilled at working together to achieve their shared objectives. In 1968, Eisner provided a pertinent analysis of the policies of the Vietnam War, in which the North Vietnamese government, President Johnson, and the American people all played important roles.

There is an irony in the common belief that game theory requires confidence in everyone's 'rationality': the very first significant game model, Schelling's analysis of pre-emptive instability (1958b, 1960), had each side worrying that the other would attack irrationally. This model was the origin of the common belief that game theory requires confidence in everyone's 'rationality.' The participants in O'Neill's model of nuclear escalation in NATO (1990) make decisions based on fleeting emotions, such as wrath and fear. These and other counterexamples demonstrate that it is not game theory per se that decides if 'national interests' or any other motivation are the aims of the players, nor does it determine whether the participants are states or non-state organisations. The decision is solely within the purview of the modeller. According to O'Neill (1994), the fundamental idea behind game theory is that each player should take into account the perspective of the other player while making decisions on their own strategy.

Moravcsik (1997) reformulates liberal international relations (IR) theory in a way that is acceptable to empirical social science that is devoid of ideology and utopia. The liberal interpretation of international relations (IR) theory elaborates on the insight that state-society relations, which can be defined as the relationship of states to the domestic and transnational social context in which they are embedded, have a significant influence on the behaviour of states in international politics. Ideas, interests, and institutions of society all have a role in creating state preferences, which are the basic societal reasons that lie behind the strategic calculations of governments. This is how societies exert influence over state conduct. Not the configuration of capabilities, as realists argue, nor the configuration of information and institutions, as

institutionalists (that is, functional regime theorists) maintain, is the most important factor in world politics, according to liberals. This is in contrast to realists, who argue that the configuration of capabilities is more important. To restate this, liberal theory merits consideration as a paradigmatic alternative that should be viewed as empirically coequal to and analytically more basic than the two prominent theories in modern international relations studies, realism and institutionalism (Moravcsik, 1997).

A disjuncture exists between the terminology used by researchers to characterise international relations as a discipline and modern empirical study on global politics. This disjuncture may be helped to be addressed by grounding liberal theory in a set of fundamental social scientific principles. In international relations (IR) literature, liberal theories that emphasise heterogeneity in state preferences are playing an increasingly significant role. These explanations include those that emphasise the causal importance of state-society relations as shaped by domestic institutions (such as the "democratic peace"), by economic interdependence (such as the "endogenous tariff theory"), and by ideas about the provision of national, political, and socioeconomic public goods (for example, theories about the relationship between nationalism and conflict). The liberal hypotheses do not contain the functional regime theory for reasons that will be elaborated on later. In spite of this, the conceptual vocabulary of IR theory has not kept up with modern research. IR theorists continue to talk as though the primary theoretical divide in the discipline was the opposition between ("neoliberal") institutionalism and realism. In most cases, liberal international relations theory of the kind that was just described is disregarded as a significant paradigmatic alternative. To make matters worse, liberal theory does not have the paradigmatic standing that would prevent adversaries from portraying it as a normative or even utopian worldview.

Post-war realist critics like Hans Morgenthau and E. H. Carr took rhetorical advantage of liberalism's historical role as an ideology to contrast the purported altruism, "idealism," "legalism," "moralism," or "utopianism" of liberalism with realism's theoretical concern with human nature as it actually is [and] historical processes as they actually take place. For example, Morgenthau and Carr contrast In the intervening forty years, not much has changed. Robert Gilpin's influential typology in international political economy contrasts two opposing points of view: one, held by mercantilists who believe that "politics determines economics," and the other, held by liberals who believe that "economics should determine politics." Both of these views are normatively liberal. According to the realist critic Kenneth Waltz, if the goals of governments become subjects of primary concern, then we are pushed back to the descriptive level, and from basic descriptions, it is impossible to make accurate generalisations. Liberals have responded to such criticisms not by proposing a united set of positive social scientific assumptions on which a nonideological and nonutopian liberal theory can be based, as has been done with considerable success for realism and institutionalism, but rather by conceding its theoretical incoherence and turning instead to intellectual history. This is in contrast to how realists and institutionalists have responded to similar criticisms, in which they have proposed a united set of positive social scientific assumptions. It is a generally held belief that every nontautological social scientific theory must be founded on a group of positive assumptions, from which arguments, explanations, and predictions may be generated. This view is supported by a large body of academic research. Nevertheless, surveys of liberal international relations (IR) theory either collect disparate views held by "classical" liberal publicists or organise nonideological liberal theory teleologically, that is,

according to its purported optimism concerning the potential for peace, cooperation, and international institutions at various points throughout world history. These kinds of investigations are an invaluable supply of theoretical and normative ideas. They do not, however, support the reference to a specific liberal international relations theory when evaluated using the more limited social scientific criteria that have been used here.

METHODOLOGY

The quantitative measurement of political behaviour and attitudes is either not desirable or impracticable, hence this study was conducted using qualitative scientific research methods instead. These methods analyse political behaviour and attitudes. Observations, qualitative content analysis, discourse analysis, document analysis, biographical research, and reports pertaining to the crisis were all used as methods for collecting qualitative data.

This investigation into the issue in the Central African Republic (CAR) utilise content analysis to investigate the reasons of the conflict, potential remedies, and future prospects from a diplomatic point of view. Analyzing the content of something is a procedure that entails arranging the information to fit into a variety of categories pertinent to the investigation (Luo, 2019). The research make use of a wide variety of documents, including those that have been published in books and journals, those that are official, those that are found in newspapers, and those that are found online.

Document analysis is the strategy that is utilised in the process of analysing these documents. This is a popular approach to study that may be utilised in both qualitative and quantitative studies to generate detailed descriptions of a particular occurrence or phenomena (Bowen, 2009). In-depth investigations that focus on a single organisation or programme also make use of it to generate detailed descriptions of that entity. Skimming, reading, and providing one's own interpretation are only few of the forms of document analysis that are included in this process (Bowen, 2009).

ANALYSIS

• *The Central Africa Republic Crisis: Evolution and Causes*

The conflict in the Central African Republic started in the beginning between two well-defined opposing factions that grew progressively fractured, with different goals and interests. This conflict has persisted for many years, despite several attempts to put an end to it. But, the source of the issue is not even remotely related to the ongoing conflict (Dukhan, 2016). According to Beninga, Manga, and Mogba (2018), the Central African Republic has been plagued by recurrent socio-political crises ever since the untimely passing of the nation's founder, Barthélémy Boganda, in the year before to the nation's independence (Beninga, 2018). Yet, it is important to keep in mind that Boganda had not yet completed his political vision to transform the Central African Republic into a republic that would really unify the colonies of French Equatorial Africa (AEF). His untimely passing away in a plane crash on March 29, 1959, while the country was still under the rule of the French colonial government, prevented the people of the Central African Republic from realising his dream of constructing a nation that could provide its people with access to food, housing, health care, and education. In addition to this, he had not been given the opportunity to completely develop his political vision or to construct a politically astute, enlightened, and vibrant team that would be capable of taking his place. His unexpected death was therefore a double blow to the people of

Ubangui, especially to the young and inexperienced leaders who were forced to inherit a complicated situation that was much above their capacities. His untimely passing was a double blow to the people of Ubangui (Beninga, 2018).

It was from this position that the CAR descended into anarchy and entered a protracted era of instability that has now lasted for well over half a century. In retrospect, Muslim Peul's opposition to colonial authority and to slave trade in the 19th century resulted in the development of a culture of confrontation and self-defense that persists to this day in the shape of village militias. This culture may be observed in action throughout the country. Likewise, the Anti-Balaka is nothing more than a physical representation of this culture. In addition to these underlying internal factors, there are also extrinsic factors. There are competitions, aspirations, geopolitics, and geo-strategies to display economic prowess, the influence of France, and other growing petroleum nations within the Central African subregion (Gabon under Bongo's rule, Chad under Idriss Déby's rule, and Congo under Sassou's rule) (Beninga, 2018).

To correctly organise this information, the crisis in the Central African Republic, which is the focus of this study, did not officially begin until the 10th of December in 2012. On that tragic day, a coalition of northern Central African Republic (CAR) rebel factions known as the Seleka launched a massive military onslaught against the Bozizé government from the north-eastern part of the nation. Mercenaries from Chad and Sudan were instrumental in the success of the invasion. They proceeded eastward till they reached Sibut and gained control of a number of towns and villages along the way (180 km from the capital, Bangui). After the Seleka offensive ended on January 11, 2013, President Bozizé and the Seleka coalition signed the Libreville Agreement to establish a Government of National Unity. By March 24 of the same year, the Seleka rebels had successfully staged a coup and taken control of the capital; as a result, they moved into the western part of the country. While Bozizé was in Cameroon, the leader of the Seleka coalition, Michel Djotodia, proclaimed himself president, dissolved the Government of National Unity and the National Assembly, suspended the constitution, and announced that he would rule by decree for at least three years. He also announced that he would rule by decree for at least three years. During this time period, Seleka warriors were responsible for a broad range of atrocities perpetrated against the civilian population. These atrocities included murder, plunder, rape, and forced relocation. (Dukhan, 2015).

Michel Djotodia emerged as the single contender for the position of Head of the Transition after the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) exerted pressure for a National Transitional Council to be established. This led to Djotodia being the only candidate for the position. Michel Djotodia was formally sworn in as Head of State of the Transition on August 18, 2013, after the creation of a new Cabinet of National Unity in June 2013. He also vowed to conducting national elections within the next 18 months (Vircoulon, 2014). While President Djotodia publicly disbanded the Seleka alliance as part of a pre-election deal, this political pronouncement had little actual impact in terms of putting a stop to the numerous atrocities perpetrated by Seleka rebels and allies of the previous president, Bozizé. In spite of this, the atrocities that were carried out by the Seleka warriors sparked a savage retaliation from loosely organised self-defense organisations that came to be known as the anti-balaka. Anti-balaka militias, who were opposed to the authority of the Seleka, carried out large-scale retaliatory attacks on mostly Muslim civilians, which added a sectarian dimension to the war. The violence that ensued resulted in the deaths of thousands of people and caused the displacement of hundreds of thousands more. On

December 5, 2013, the anti-balaka coordinated a vicious attack against the Muslim population in the capital, where more than 1,000 civilians were killed. By the 10th of January 2014, Michel Djotodia and his Prime Minister, Nicolas Tiangaye, were forced to resign following an ECCAS meeting in N'Djamena. Nicolas Tiangaye was also forced to resign as a result of the meeting (Dukhan, 2015).

Even after the Transitional National Council chose Catherine Samba-Panza as the new temporary head of state on January 23, the situation continued to worsen. As a result, the United Nations Security Council gave its approval in September 2014 for the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping mission known as the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, or MINUSCA, and urged the country to hold elections as soon as possible but not later than February 2015. Towards the end of 2015, the instability of the nation was maintained by many forms of violence, ranging from sectarian violence to that carried out by Nairobits. Despite the fact that in September 2015, sectarian violence in Bangui resulted in the deaths of 79 civilians and injuries to 512 others, President Catherine Samba-Panza of the Transitional Government accused "Nairobits" of attempting to organise a coup against the government of transition and to undermine the electoral process. This accusation was made despite the fact that the violence in Bangui occurred in September 2015. It's interesting to note that when Faustin Archange Touadera was elected president of the Republic in 2016, there was a glimmer of optimism, but it didn't last long. Once again, this expectation was rapidly crushed as a result of a rise in the level of violence and instability across the nation (Historical Origin of Sectarian Violence, 2020). Thus, the security situation in the Central African Republic (CAR) has worsened, and the humanitarian crisis has become more severe, despite the fact that the country made a peaceful transition to a democratic government in 2016. (Amelie, 2018).

Since May of 2017, there has been an increase in the number of hotspots, and there has been increased violence in several regions of the nation, which has already resulted in more than 180,000 people being displaced only in 2017. (UN OCHA, 2017). It is estimated that armed groups control close to 70 percent of the region. The peace accord that was reached in Khartoum is still being partly respected, and there is a very serious possibility that it will continue to fall apart. The elections that took place in December 2020 were successful, which helped to alleviate tensions between armed factions and the government (IRC, 2020).

Yet, more than a quarter of all individuals living in Central Africa have been compelled to abandon their homes, and more than 600,000 people have been displaced inside the country itself, while another 600,000 have fled to countries that are nearby (UN OCHA, 2017).

A significant portion of the population, almost one-third, is struggling with severe levels of food insecurity. More than half of the country's population, or over 2.6 million people, have been made eligible for humanitarian aid as a result of the crisis, which has grabbed the attention of the world community. The situation is still unstable and precarious, and there are continuous assaults on civilians, including targeted and indiscriminate strikes on humanitarian actors. These attacks take place on a regular basis. The number of individuals in need of protection and basic services is estimated to be 2.5 million, which is more than half of the population. The humanitarian needs are huge. At the same time period, the Humanitarian Response Plan was only allocated 36.5% of the necessary money, which resulted in a shortfall of \$316 million. The Humanitarian Response Plan for the Central African Republic in 2018 totals \$518

million (Amelie, 2018). Since May 2017, the security situation has been deteriorating in several sections of the nation, which is leading to instability and pushing people who are already vulnerable to bear the weight of the crisis once again. As a direct consequence, there have been at least 249 arbitrary executions and more than 180,000 people forced to flee their homes as a result of it. Since the beginning of 2017, the number of people who are in need of assistance has increased from 2.2 million to 2.5 million. This level has not been achieved since August 2014, and it reflects a rise of approximately 50 percent since January 2017 when it was last at this point (Amelie, 2018).

- **Actors in the Central Africa Republic Crisis**

It is important to note that the conflict in the CAR involves actors from different sociological backgrounds, often with conflicting or sometimes overlapping political and, or financial interests. There are major and minor actors as well as internal and external actors. This study however, prefers to group the actors as internal and external actors for proper analysis.

(a) Internal Actors

(i) The Seleka Movement

Seleka, which literally translates to "alliance" in Sango, the country's native language, is a combination of armed organisations that have a common belief that they are on the periphery of political and economic power. This coalition was formed as a consequence of a protracted fight to remove former President Francois Bozizé from power immediately after he assumed office in 2003, with help from Chad and France (ICG, 2007). Their struggle for political power lasted for close to eight years, during which time François Bozizé eventually lost the support of both the members of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and of the French. The Seleka was supposedly created in 2012 after a few different groups explored the potential of forming an alliance in order to topple President Bozizé. In December 2012, the three main factions (the Convention Patriotique du Salut du Kodro, CPSK, led by Mohamed Moussa Dhaffane; the Convention des Patriotes pour la Justice et la Paix (CPJP-Fondamentale), led by Nourredine Adam; and the Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement (UFDR), led by Michel Djotodia) began their offensive from the north-east of the country. Several of the current leaders of the Seleka were Bozizé's erstwhile comrades who had assisted him in seizing power in 2003 but who afterwards felt they had been deceived by Bozizé (ICG, 2017).

(ii) The Anti-Balaka Movement

It is interesting to note that the anti-balaka movement sprung out in the second half of 2013 as a response to the massive brutality perpetrated against people by the Seleka forces. The acronym "antiballes AK-47" is where the term "anti-balaka" originates from. Armed militias make up the anti-balaka movement because its members are under the impression that the amulets and artefacts they carry will shield them from enemy fire. It was said that these militias are a continuation of a time-honored history of armed conflict. "Less standing troops than networks that can be engaged when the need arises" is how they have been described. This legacy of self-defense organisations has been formed primarily among the ethnic groups of Gbaya, Banda, Mandja, and Mboum, who organised insurrections against the colonial authorities (Kisangani, 2015).

It comes as a surprise that the anti-balaka militias quickly acquired strong anti-Seleka beliefs, which then morphed into an anti-Muslim mentality that was widely embraced. In the beginning, they carried out systematic assaults on any and all civilians whom they suspected of being Seleka or of working in conjunction with the Seleka. This included individuals of Chadian descent, the Fulani, the Gula, and the Runga. Shortly after that, they started to target and harass all Muslims. They see the Muslim population as invaders from other countries who have looted the nation and believe themselves to be fighting for the "genuine" inhabitants of the Central African Republic. The International Commission of Inquiry reached this conclusion in December 2014 and said that "the ethnic cleansing of the Muslim community by the anti-balaka constituted a crime against humanity." Throughout the span of 2013-2015, the anti-balaka campaign has progressed at both the local and the national level, but the aim of the militias has remained the same: "Muslims must all leave the country or die" (FIDH, 2015).

(iii) Ex-Seleka Groups

As a direct result of this, Nourredine Adam established the Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de Centrafrique (FPRC) in Birao in July of 2014, and Michel Djotodia is a supporter of the organisation. The members of this group are considered to be Seleka movement hardliners. The FPRC's primary objective was to advance the cause of nation fragmentation as quickly as possible. Both the Brazzaville Accord (2014) and the DDR deal have been rejected by the group, which has been hampering efforts to find a settlement to the conflict (2015). Moreover, it has declined to recognise and engage in negotiations with the transitional administration that is being headed by Catherine Samba-Panza. In 2015, the group issued a demand for a third transition with new authorities of transition, in which they expected to play a more important role. This transition was to take place under new authorities (Dukhan, 2018).

Significantly, the Mouvement Patriotique pour la Centrafrique (MPC) was founded in July 2015 by individuals who had previously served in Seleka and came from the Kaga-Bandoro area. Mohamed Bahar and Alkatim Mahamat, both of whom had previously been members of the FPRC, established the organisation as a response to their disputes with Nourredine's ideas. The Transitional Government recognises the MPC as a moderate armed force that has acknowledged the numerous peace accords and the recommendations of the Bangui Forum. The organisation maintains that it is opposed to the idea of partitioning the area despite having signed the DDR agreement.

In addition, Mohamed Moussa Dhaffane, who was a co-founder of the Seleka movement and a former second vice-president of the FPRC, was the one who came up with the idea for the Séléka Rénovée pour la Paix et la Justice. In August of 2014, Nourredine Adam took the action of suspending Dhaffane from his activities in the FPRC for "high treason." After that, Dhaffane established the Reformed Seleka. The former head of Seleka is opposed to the idea of splitting the nation, although he does advocate for political inclusivity. It does not seem that he is in charge of any fighting forces, and the numerous public views adopted by the Reformed Seleka appear to reflect his personal political objectives (Dukhan, 2018).

(iv) Anti-Balaka Groups

As was the case with the Ex-Seleka organisations, the Anti-balaka groups developed with opposing viewpoints about the nature of their political goals. One of these organisations was called the Coordination Nationale des Libérateurs du Peuple

Centrafricain (CLPC), and its current leader is Patrice Edouard Ngaïssona. The CLPC was established in 2014. Bozizé and Ngaïssona had tight ties before to the formation of the organisation; nonetheless, Ngaïssona has gradually grown farther and further apart from the previous president. He made the announcement in 2014 that his goal was to turn the anti-balaka movement into a political party that would be able to take part in the election process in 2015. (Thienot, 2015). Nonetheless, the Constitutional Court did not uphold his candidature for president of the United States in the election that was held. During the Bangui Forum in 2015, he was the representative for the anti-balaka and signed the DDR agreement on their behalf as the representative of the anti-balaka delegation. Ngaïssona, on the other hand, has only a very small amount of control over the movement and only reflects his own personal political objectives. This fact is extremely crucial to keep in mind. In September 2014, one of the leaders of the anti-balaka movement and a former assistant to the coordinator of the CLPC, Sebastien Wenezaoui, established the Mouvement Patriotique pour l'Avenir – I Kwé with the intention of eventually transforming it into a political party. Wenezaoui said that he was selected as the new national coordinator of the anti-balaka movement by three hundred of its leaders. In August of 2015, the administration of Kamoun appointed him as minister of the environment, and he opposed carrying out a third transition during that time (Dukhan, 2018).

In 2015, Maxime Mokom and Joachim Kokate, also known as "Nairobiists," claimed that Ngaïssona did not represent the movement and rejected his capacity to represent the anti-balaka at the Bangui Forum. They made these claims in response to Ngaïssona's capacity to represent the anti-balaka at the Bangui Forum. In May of 2015, they established something that they referred to as a genuine coordination (Zamane, 2015). Both Mokom and Kokate desired for former President Bozizé to regain his position as head of state. This alliance has the backing of Bozizé and his party, the Kwa Na Kwa (KNK), as well as grassroots support from a variety of anti-balaka organisations, in particular those from the Bossangoa region. In January of 2015, in Nairobi, this coalition officially joined forces with the FRPC led by Nourredine Adam by signing a contract. By the end of 2015, in conjunction with the FPRC, it fueled instability and advocated for a third transition in order to halt the election process. Mokom, who is working towards the incorporation of anti-balaka fighters into the FACA, is in charge of this coordination for the most part. Nonetheless, there are now a large number of other anti-balaka organisations and competing coordinating bodies active over the whole of the nation, mostly in the south-west, in some neighbourhoods of Bangui, and in the geographic centre of the country.

(v) Other Armed Groups

In a situation of this kind, the participation of other armed groups is, of course, unavoidable. Martin Koumtamadji, better known as Adboulaye Miskine, was an officer who was close to former President Patassé when he initiated the formation of the Democratic Front of the Central African People (FDPC) in the year 2004. Similarly, Révolution et Justice (RJ) was established by Armel Sayo in the northern part of the Ouham Pende area at the tail end of 2013. Additionally, after the Seleka coup, Sayo, a former military commander who was loyal to previous President Patassé, established the Comité National pour la Restauration de la Démocratie (CNRD). After this, he established connections with the FDPC of Miskine. In addition, a Peuhl-dominated organisation that originated in the western part of the nation (north of Bouar) and has been commanded by Colonel Sidiki since January 2016 came into being. Sidiki is a

former soldier who served with the Front Populaire pour le Redressement (FPR), which was commanded by the well-known Chadian rebel Baba Lade (Dukhan, 2018).

There were also transitional authorities, a transitional government, and main national security forces in addition to the players mentioned above. For example, prior to the coup that took place in March 2013, the FACA consisted of between 5,000 and 6,000 people, the bulk of whom were based in Bangui. In addition to this, we may also classify some of them as political parties. On July 15, 2015, there were 69 political parties and political associations that were recognised by the government, and there were 21 political parties that were waiting for official recognition. Some examples of these political parties include the Kwa Na Kwa (KNK), which was a ruling party under former President Francois Bozizé, the Mouvement de Libération du Peuple Centrafricain (MPLC), which is led by Martin Ziguélé and served as Prime Minister under the Patasse regime (2001-2003), and the Rassemblement Dé There are also religious leaders included in the group of actors, for instance. In November of 2015, a visit by Pope Francis had a very good influence on those dealing with the situation on a grassroots level. The private sector was the most significant contributor to the internal factor (Dukhan, 2018).

(b) External Actors

(i) Regional Organisation and Regional States

Regional organisations such as the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the African Union were among the most influential players from the outside world (AU). Chad was one of the other actors in the area. In point of fact, Chad was the most important participant throughout the crisis, and the country's attitude has been unclear. President Déby of Chad was a participant in the overthrow of Bozizé and also played the role of "kingmaker" in the end of the crisis (Welz, 2014). Yet, the participation of Chad in the Ebola epidemic has created a significant number of problems. Republic of the Congo came in second place behind Chad. As an example, the President of the Republic of Congo, Denis Sassou Nguesso, served as the mediator after being nominated by ECCAS. Also, the nation has sent soldiers as well as financial support to the CAR peacekeeping operations and to the government of Djotodia. In the meanwhile, the mediation effort from the Congo has been criticised. Since 2014, Samba-Panza and Sassou Nguesso's relationship has been strained due to their disagreements. On the one hand, Angola became engaged in the settlement of the crisis in the CAR in the year 2014. The two nations came to an agreement in March of 2014 to guarantee that the operation of the government and to handle concerns relating to the humanitarian situation. In point of fact, the financial protocol was a contribution in the amount of ten million dollars in cash that was promised in March of 2014. On the other hand, the Cameroonian attitude on the crisis in the CAR was seen to be unclear by many. After the Seleka coup, Paul Bia made the decision to host François Bozizé for a period of two months. This decision was made despite the fact that the majority of the ECCAS heads of state favoured Michel Djotodia as the new president of the transition (Dukhan, 2018).

(ii) International Organisations

It is important to emphasise the role of foreign organisations in the situation in the Central African Republic, beginning with the United Nations. Surprisingly, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has been the primary international actor in the settlement of the crisis in the Central African Republic (CAR), with France taking the

lead on the matter. In general, member nations have shared viewpoints on the conflict as well as requests for action to be taken in response to it (Zifcak, 2015). The United Nations Security Council came to an agreement, which ultimately resulted in the deployment of MINUSCA in 2014. In April of 2014, United Nations Security Council Resolution 2149 authorised the establishment of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). Its robust mission comprised a multi-pronged emphasis on political issues, security concerns, and humanitarian aid over the whole of the nation, not just in Bangui, with a maximum of 12,000 men.

As a general matter of fact, it was observed that the European Union had also been present throughout the coup. Catherine Ashton, the High Representative of the EU, issued the following statement after the coup: "violent or unlawful transitions of government remain unacceptable." She issued a request to all parties to participate in negotiations and to work within the parameters of the agreement that was reached in Libreville on January 11, 2013, in order to find a peaceful path ahead (EU, 2013). While most of its programmes were put on hold, the European Union did not cease its collaboration with the new Seleka authority. The International Contact Group on the Central African Republic was another notable organisation. This group was established with the purpose of coordinating the activities of the many international organisations and players engaged in the settlement of the crisis in the CAR. The first gathering took place in November of 2014, and there were a total of eight people there. The International Coordinating Group for the Central African Republic (ICG-CAR) had already held eight meetings by the time July 2015 rolled around, and the number of people on its participant list had increased to 34, indicating a growing interest in the crisis in the CAR among international actors (Dukhan, 2018).

It is also crucial to mention that in addition to the aforementioned foreign players, there were many others, such as France, South Africa, Darfur, and so on, who acted independently in the conflict. Together, the actions and involvement of these players shaped the history of the crisis, with some of them advocating for the crisis to continue while others argued against it. Although while the purpose of this article is not to criticise the involvement of any player, it is important to note that the engagement of some actors has continued to stoke the fires of the crisis, either directly or indirectly (Zifcak, 2015).

The foreign media often covered the war in simple terms, portraying it as a struggle between the mostly Muslim Seleka troops and the predominantly Christian anti-balaka militias. This was the case despite the fact that the crisis continues to weaken the country. The extent of the sectarian violence has reached historic dimensions as a result of fundamental concerns that have not been addressed and a delayed reaction from the international community.

Regrettably, antagonism between different religious groups is widespread. In spite of the many peace deals that have been reached, the primary objective of the anti-balaka is still to drive the country's Muslim population out of the country. The process of reconciliation must continue to be a top priority. Unprecedented levels of impunity continue to be a key source of worry. Mistrust throughout the populace is continually fueled by the absence of responsibility for the crimes that have been committed. Investigations into crimes have been impeded, however, both by a lack of political willpower and an insufficient support system within the court system. As a direct result of the breakdown of the state and the economy, armed and criminal organisations were given the opportunity to flourish in an environment devoid of law and order. Armed

organisations were able to seize control of the vast natural resources in the nation and profit from their exploitation after doing so. The earnings that are made allow them to continue their operations and provide a powerful incentive for them to continue the fight rather than negotiate for peace (Nathalia, 2016).

Long term, in an attempt to undermine the transition's stability, the former leaders Djotodia and Bozizé, together with their respective deputies, have forged opportunistic alliances and alternative peace initiatives. It has been difficult to establish a consensus in political discussions due, in part, to the fragmentation of the armed organisations as well as rivalry among the leaders of those groups. The timeline of the election process has been plagued by a series of setbacks: the timeframe has been mostly determined by the international community, which grossly miscalculated the extent and complexity of the war. The process of conflict settlement has been largely impacted by global political goals, which do not necessarily correspond with the requirements of the local community (Nathalia, 2016).

- ***Efforts to End the Central Africa Republic Crisis***

When it first began, several initiatives have been taken in an attempt to put an end to the crisis in the Central African Republic (CAR). As has been established elsewhere, the upheaval that occurred before to 2013 served as the impetus for the crisis that formally began that year. All of the attempts that were made to put an end to the crisis, which were too many to be recounted in a single chapter, have resulted in either very little or nothing at all. It is not necessary to elaborate on how the growth of armed groups and the practise of co-option had turned the Central African Republic into a fertile field for peace deals; these facts speak for themselves (Mohamed, 2021). During the years 1997 and 2020, thirteen significant agreements were struck by a variety of diverse organisations. These include the Bangui Agreements from January 1997 (Accord de Bangui), the Libreville Agreement from October 2002 (Accord de Libreville), the Sirte Agreement from February 2007 (Accord de Syrte), the Birao Peace Agreement from April 2007 (Accord de Paix de Birao), the Libreville Peace Agreement from May 2008 (Accord de Paix de Libreville), the Libreville Comprehensive Peace Agreement from June 2008 (Accord de Paix Global de Libreville), and the Libreville Accord Sant'Egidio Entente- Political Accord for Peace in the CAR (Entente de Sant'Egidio-Accord Politique pour la Paix en RCA) and February 2019 Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the CAR (Accord Politique pour la Paix et la Réconciliation en RCA) (Mohamed, 2021).

In the year 2021, the situation in CAR is unimportant. Report from Bangui/Dakar, 22 January 2021- According to UNICEF, the recent surge of violence and displacement is increasing the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance at a time when the people of Central Africa are already suffering with the effects of the COVID-19 epidemic as well as years of war and instability (UNICEF, 2021). As was covered in the prior chapter, these accords were the finished results of a variety of diverse players working for peace and reconciliation, ranging from state actors to international actors. The official beginning of the 21st century marks the beginning of the history of United Nations interventions in the Central African Republic (CAR). First, the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) brought the Central African area into the conversation, and then the Eastern and Central African States (ECCAS) did the same.

Since 2003, when it suspended the country following the coup d'état carried out by Francois Bozizé on March 17, the African Union (AU) has been making decisions

regarding the Central African Republic through the predecessor to its Peace and Security Council, the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution. These decisions have been made through the Peace and Security Council. In point of fact, as the situation intensified in 2012, ECCAS was the first to take up the problem and lead the discussions between the Seleka coalition and the Bozizé administration between late 2012 and early 2013. These negotiations took place between late 2012 and early 2013. Eventually, the Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central Africa (MICOPAX), which had been stationed in the CAR since 2008, was succeeded by the African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA), which was established by the African Union in December 2013, and by the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) in September 2014. (Mohamed, 2016). In spite of the conflicts that exist between the three organisations, the precarious situation in the nation has not improved. Chosen peace accords would, as a result, be evaluated alongside the corresponding efforts of the parties involved, as well as the reasons why the peace agreements were not a feasible option to end the war.

(i) The Libreville Agreement 2013

In January of 2013, the Seleka, François Bozizé, and a number of opposition parties, dormant rebel groups, and civil society organisations came to an agreement that was referred to as the Libreville Accord (Dukhan, 2015). Yet, there were underlying problems since there was an increase in violence during the time period around the postponed elections in 2011. According to the non-governmental organisation Amnesty International, as much as two thirds of the country was outside the jurisdiction of the government, and thousands of people were forced to evacuate because of violent assaults. At the same time, Bozizé became increasingly isolated and 'paranoid,' losing support from his allies, the population at large, and most significantly from his two primary sources of support, which were Chadian President Débe and the international community. During this time, Bozizé also became increasingly paranoid. In September 2012, the President of the Chadian Republic, Débe, ordered the Chadian bodyguards, who were also members of FACA, to stop guarding Bozizé. As a consequence of this, Séléka used force to seize control of twelve towns throughout the nation, and then presented Bozizé with official demands, demanding him to fulfil the obligations he had made as part of the peace accord that had been reached in 2008. As a result, these demands became more stringent, and Séléka went into the discussions for the peace deal in 2013 asking that Bozizé resign from his position as president (ICG, 2013). In point of fact, the 2013 Libreville Peace Accord was reached in January after just three days of discussions between the dominant party, the Séléka coalition, opposition parties, and non-active rebel groups and CSOs (ICG, 2013).

It's interesting to note that the ECCAS in Gabon served as the mediator for the talks. The presidents of ECCAS had a significant impact on the outcome of the procedure. Another thing that was seen was that the quickness with which the agreements were struck may be an indication of how improbable the participants believed it was that they would have to comply with the pledges. [Citation needed] In practise, the agreement included the following provisions: a ceasefire; limiting Bozizé's term as President until the end of his mandate in 2016 without a possibility to be re-elected; the formation of a government of national union within twelve months (to include the majority party, opposition parties, non-active rebel movements, the Séléka coalition, and civil society); elections; reforms to defence, security, territorial

administration, and the judicial system; and a continued DDR and SSR (BINUCA Reports, 2013).

Regrettably, one month later in February 2013, Bozizé formally suggested by decree a new national government. Nevertheless, the opposition party or Séléka did not welcome the list of members of the proposed government (Herbert, 2013). Eric Massi, a spokesperson for the Séléka alliance, said that the conversations that took place in Libreville were quite brief and left an unpleasant taste. There has not been made an effort to address the fundamental issues. Bozizé has not fulfilled any of his obligations since the signing of the agreement in Libreville, with the exception of the appointment of the Prime Minister. This has gone on for more than a month. The prisoners who were meant to be freed have not been released even though it was expected that they would be. The soldiers from South Africa are still present in the nation. In addition to this, it has stationed members of the Central African and South African armies in the city of Bangassou, despite the fact that he should not be engaged in matters pertaining to defence. In March of 2013, Séléka sent the government a list of eleven demands and threatened military action if the requests were not met within three days. The demands were submitted to the government in March of 2013. Séléka nonetheless reached Bangui between the 23rd and 25th of March 2013, assumed the presidency, and established a new transition government with Djotodia as President. The new transition government will be composed of 34 members, including nine ministers from Séléka, eight opposition parties, one former member of Bozizé's party, and 16 others from civil society or other political parties. Elections will be held in three years after the formation of the transition government. Reports from BINUCA, 2013). A devastating blow, as well as an abject failure.

(ii) The Brazzaville Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, July 2014

The fact that the previously stated deal did not work out and the ongoing dynamics of the crisis have opened the door to the possibility of a new peace treaty makes the situation all the more intriguing to consider. This is the 2014 Brazzaville Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities, and the negotiations leading up to it brought together representatives of armed groups that had previously been affiliated with the ex-Seleka and anti-balaka movements, as well as representatives of the CNT, political parties, civil society organisations, and religious communities. This time around, President Denis Sassou Nguesso of the Congo played the role of mediator, and after three days of discussions, an agreement was finally reached and signed (Dukhan, 2015). The agreement included the promotion of the reconciliation process as well as the cessation of hostilities by armed groups across the entire territory of the Central African Republic (CAR). Additionally, any proposed partition of the country was abandoned, and all mercenaries were returned to their respective countries of origin with the assistance of international forces (Centrafrique Presse, 2014).

Both the Libreville Agreement and the Brazzaville Agreement have been deemed to be unsuccessful in their respective endeavours. One of the reasons it was acceptable was because it did not address the underlying problems that were causing the dispute. That being the case, it follows that any provision for peace needs to pay attention to the underlying reasons that are driving the conflict. In spite of this, the UN Panel of Experts stated in a report that was published in October 2014 that "the Brazzaville agreement adds a new layer to an increasing number of agreements, declarations, and unwritten decisions that have been signed in response to successive crises in the Central African Republic." In a nutshell, the failure to follow the

agreement was due to the continual splintering of armed organisations as well as the rivalries that existed amongst the various commanders. The forces that favour Michel Djotodia and Francois Bozizé rejected the deal, which led to Djotodia and Bozizé forging an opportunistic alliance with the goal of securing their access to power and destabilising the transition. Both Michel Djotodia and Francois Bozizé are now in exile (Dukhan, 2015).

(iii) The Bangui Forum on National Reconciliation, May 2015

From 2013 through 2014 and now into 2015, the Bangui Forum has brought together around 600 people between the 4th and 11th of May. This seems to be one of the greatest gatherings in the Republic with the purpose of settling the peace dispute. The objective, which was conceived in the most appropriate manner, was to formulate a common strategy for the future of the nation. For the first time ever, national authorities have been given the power to organise consultations over the whole of the national territory in order to gather the complaints and concerns of the people. Meetings were held in Bangui to explore topics like social and economic growth, peace and security, justice and reconciliation, and governance. Participants came from a wide variety of organisations, including the transitional government, national political parties, the most powerful armed factions, the corporate sector, civic society, traditional leaders, and religious groups. Participants adopted a number of recommendations, and nine factions signed a new DDR agreement. The agreement called for all combatants to give up their weapons by the time of the national elections; the release of child soldiers; a timeline for elections and the extension of the current government's mandate; national and local mechanisms for justice and reconciliation; social and economic development priorities; and participants adopted these recommendations. The Bangui Forum made it possible for conversations to take place on both the regional and national levels (Copley, 2015).

Then, why was it unable to keep the water in? Simply put, this is due to the fact that it failed to propose any actionable measures towards achieving peace and putting an end to sectarian bloodshed. Dukhan (2016) discovered further problems that justified the project's cancellation. Secondly, he investigated the fact that the proposals were lofty but impractical when taking into account the current situation and the ability of the national government to successfully execute them. Second, there was not enough effort put into providing road maps and action plans. Third, the donor community was not included in the process, which leads to scepticism regarding the future of these suggestions. Finally, members of the commissions that were responsible for the follow-up were chosen, but there was not a large amount of progress accomplished. The parties of Djotodia and Bozizé were not allowed to participate in the Forum since their respective leaders were either in exile or subject to international sanctions (Dukhan, 2015). Ex-Seleka and anti-balaka militias, which are supporters of the country's previous presidents, staged demonstrations in the nation's capital on May 11, 2015. The leaders of armed organisations had the expectation that their fighters would be granted amnesty, and they were against extending the transition period.

(iv) Sant'Egidio Entente- Political Accord for Peace in the CAR June 2017

The signing of a peace agreement on June 20, 2017, regarding the conflict in the Central African Republic, which took place in Sant'Egidio in Rome, set the door for the pacification of the nation and seemed to be one of the most lesson-applied peace agreement sessions ever conducted. It is possible that the Community of Sant'Egidio

had a role in the mediation process that led to the successful completion of the text, which calls for an immediate ceasefire. Observers from the world community, the United Nations Special Envoy Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, the European Union, and the Italian government were present for the signing of the agreement. In a similar manner, the agreement, which was signed by the representatives of the numerous political-military groups that are currently present in the country as well as by the envoys of President Touadéra - and which was the result of intense days (and nights) of work - revolves around three main points, which were illustrated in a press conference by the President of the Community of Sant'Egidio, Marco Impagliazzo (SANTEGIDIO, 2021). It is interesting to note that Andrea Riccardi, the creator of Sant'Egidio, was also there at the signing. In fact, he was there between emotional moments and the sombre singing of the national anthem. Pope Francis spoke at the beginning of the meeting in Rome on the previous Sunday during the Angelus prayer. He recalled his historic trip to Central Africa in November 2015 and encouraged the delegations that were present at the meeting to "relaunch and strengthen the peace process." The meeting was held in the Vatican. These relate to the political, economic, and security plans, as well as the humanitarian and social ones (International Crisis Group, 2022).

The document reaffirms the integrity of the national territory, the respect and recognition of all political-military groups, the commitment to the reconstruction of the country, the respect for the results of the presidential and legislative elections held in 2016, and, more generally, the building of "a dynamics of reconciliation." In addition to the ceasefire that is under the control of the international community, the document also reaffirms the following: the respect for the results of the 2016 presidential and legislative elections; the commitment to the reconstruction of the country; At the economic, humanitarian, and social level, all parties are committed, among other things, to the reconstruction work and in the protection of national and international NGOs that are present in the country. In terms of security, the free movement of people and goods is guaranteed, as is the re-establishment of state authority throughout the national territory (International Crisis Group, 2022).

It was thought that this agreement was the deal that would terminate all other agreements on the crisis and that it was a genuine road map to get out of the issue. This deal, which was reached on favourable terms, included provisions for a blanket amnesty for all armed factions. Nonetheless, the accords reached in Rome were violently rejected as well. The African Union provided sponsorship for peace negotiations that took place in Khartoum (Sudan) in 2019, which were attended by the government and 14 armed factions. On February 6, 2019, the peace deal was signed in the city of Bangui. The formation of the new administration in March drew the ire of all of the armed organisations and political parties that comprised the opposition. Hostilities were warned to continue by several armed factions. All of these agreements stipulated, among other things, for a rapid end to the hostilities, the renunciation of the rebels to the use of violent conflict, and the sharing of authority. These accords, which form the basis of the process of putting in place a peace process, have not been honoured (Azou-Passonda, et. al. 2019).

(v) The Bangui Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation, February 2019

As soon as it became clear that the Sant'Egidio Accord in Rome would not provide a solution to the situation, it was only logical for there to be another round of peace talks. As a result, in 2019, a second gathering was held in Khartoum, the Republic of the Sudan, from the 24th of January to the 5th of February. This gathering was held within

the framework of the dialogue process that was outlined in the road map of the African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic, which was signed in Libreville, Gabon, on the 17th of July 2017. (United Nations, 2019). The primary purpose of this agreement was to facilitate negotiation between the government and armed groups, with the final goal of achieving a complete consensus on all outstanding issues and therefore bringing an end to the crisis once and for all. Noted in the agreement were the efforts made by the Panel of Facilitators of the African Initiative in Bouar from the 28th to the 30th of August 2018, which resulted in the consolidation of the demands of the armed groups and the facilitation of a direct dialogue; and, acknowledging the unprecedented investment of the international community, including the political commitment of the African Union and the United Nations, as well as the multifaceted support of the partners of the Central Africa Partnership, the agreement also stated that the parties to the conflict would continue to work (United Nations, 2019).

A comprehensive examination of the situation in the Central African Republic in general and the nature of the crisis in the country in particular was carried out during the meeting. They came to the conclusion that the underlying causes of the present conflict needed to be eradicated once and for all, and that they should work towards fostering true national reconciliation based on a social compact between the citizens of the Central African Republic. They agreed to the following certain principles, including the principles for a lasting settlement of the conflict, commitments of the government, commitments of the armed groups, specific issues of disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration, and repatriation, justice and national reconciliation, seasonal pastoral migration, transitional security arrangements, and democratic elections. Keeping in mind earlier agreements, as well as the difficulties encountered in implementing and monitoring them, they agreed to the following certain principles. According to a report by the International Crisis Group:

New expectations for peace have been raised as a result of a recent deal that was sponsored by the African Union and signed in February 2019 by the administration as well as fourteen armed factions. Despite this, there has been no letup in the violence, and the level of political tension is once again on the increase. Crisis Group gives tangible advice on how to manage both the important election period in late 2020 and the long term, with an emphasis on how to convince armed groups to lay down their weapons. This guidance is provided via on-the-ground reporting and campaigning by Crisis Group (International Crisis Group, 2022).

Nonetheless, the peace agreement that was struck in the Central African Republic (CAR) at the beginning of 2019 is the eighth one to be made in the country in the last seven years. These figures show how tough it will be even to attempt to put an end to the country's multi-sided war. Having said that, the settlement was achieved this time after more thorough preparations for discussions and with stronger international assistance than in the past, perhaps enhancing the prospects for a durable stop to the bloodshed that has caused over 1.2 million people to be displaced. The events of the last several months, on the other hand, have given rise to a rising fear that the accord, which was always precarious, may not be able to successfully take root. Elizabeth Murray and Rachel Sullivan, both of the US Institute of Peace, examine what aspects of the present peace deal are unique and evaluate the steps that have been taken towards putting the agreement into effect (USIP, 2023).

The most important issue is, how does this peace accord compare to others that have been reached in the past? What was the reason for it? The lessons learned

from unsuccessful negotiations in the past were taken into account throughout the process of reaching this agreement. This time, the mediation team, which was led by the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), spent a year consulting with the government of the Central African Republic, armed groups, and members of civil society in order to reach a common understanding of the issues and grievances at play and to set the terms for a dialogue. It was a significant departure from the old practise, which consisted of accords being discussed among elites and signed outside of CAR. These symbolic efforts to react to the people are now being supplemented with increased follow-up by international stakeholders who are looking to hold all parties responsible for compliance with the agreement (USIP, 2023).

It is credible to acknowledge the presence of the United States of America, the European Union (EU), and Russia, all of which supported the preparations for the talks along with the African Union (AU) and the United Nations, with support coming from ECCAS in the lead-up to and follow-up on the process. During the preparations for the discussion, Russia and Sudan collaborated to try to launch a parallel peace process on their own. In the end, the two processes were combined into one in order to avoid them from becoming destructive to one another. In no way, shape, or form has the process of implementation gone off without a hitch. This includes the fact that President Faustin-Archange Touadéra of the Central African Republic (CAR) created a cabinet that allocates 13 ministerial-level jobs and many advisory and regional-level roles to the various leaders of the armed groups in the country. Nevertheless, this occurred when a number of the armed organisations voiced their disagreement with the president's first nominations of eight heads of armed groups, stating that the number was inadequate. As a direct result of their reservations, the African Union (AU) decided to hold extra discussions in Addis Ababa during the month of March. In the end, the government expanded the number of places available for armed organisations and made more roles available to Muslims. It put an end to a complaint that had been lingering for a long time with both groups, despite the fact that other disagreements regarding parcelling posts had already arisen (USIP, 2023).

The United States Institute of Peace provided financial assistance to ECCAS, which enabled the organisation to hold workshops in the Central African Republic (CAR) to improve understanding of the agreement between the government of the CAR and the leaders of armed groups, as well as to explain the agreement to rank-and-file combatants. The parties to the agreement have seen significant improvements in their ability to communicate with one another and their level of understanding as a result of these workshops, which also served to foster a conversation between representatives of the government and leaders and members of armed groups. Even if there has been a significant delay in the implementation of a plan to set up combined military formations in order to increase trust between armed groups and the government, it is not in anyone's best interest to cast doubt on the viability of the project. According to the terms of the peace deal, the "special mixed security forces" will be comprised of anywhere from 600 to 1200 members of armed groups. Nevertheless, on August 27, the head of a rebel organisation known as the Mouvement Patriotique pour la Centrafrique (MPC), Mahamat Al Khatim, tendered his resignation from his position in the office of the prime minister due to disagreements about the units. The leader of the 3R rebel organisation, Sidiki Abbas, behaved in the same manner. There were also conflicts between the government and other armed groups over their respective duties and responsibilities within these units, which were stresses that were worsened by the lack of detail in the Khartoum agreement. That was unsettling, and in the event that the

units were to be successful, they would demand considerable attention from the parties to the agreement as well as the world community (USIP, 2023).

It should come as no surprise that the implementations of this accord were already lacking in strength. The fact that high levels of violent conflict still exist is obviously the most significant critique. An open source database known as the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) found that in the first six months after the agreement was signed, there were 83 violent incidents involving Central African armed groups and local militias. These incidents resulted in the deaths of 267 people. At the same time period, the number of attacks on humanitarian relief workers almost quadrupled, and a record number of 1.2 million people were displaced as a result of the crisis. However, the agreement did not apply to newly created armed organisations, civil society, or any other kind of non-armed player. At the Bangui Forum, which was a national forum for peace and reconciliation that took place in 2015, the government mediators determined that only the 14 groups that had signed the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration agreement would be permitted to participate. The perception that participation in this process could produce positions that differ from those established by the Bangui Forum, which is still in effect and is used to inform policymaking, was the driving factor behind the decision to exclude civil society from the dialogue that took place in Khartoum. Despite this, civil society was included in consultations that took place in the lead up to the talks. As a direct consequence of this, the viewpoints of regular residents were not given enough consideration throughout the discussions (USIP, 2023).

Misunderstandings that continued to exist over the application of some clauses, namely those pertaining to amnesty and power sharing, were another problem that arose. Touadéra has made it publicly known that members of armed organisations will not be granted impunity, and he has also indicated that members of armed groups must be integrated in the democratic process. Also ignored was the demand for amnesty voiced by several armed factions, which leaves open the possibility of more violent struggle in the future. These difficulties brought to light the need for an inclusive process of implementation that makes room for ongoing mediation and discussion. In addition to this, it was claimed that the people who live in the Central African Republic had differing opinions on the accord. Although some of them were hopeful, others were sceptical about how much difference it would make in the violence. Working around a plan and process that is functional, it therefore means that in CAR, where approximately 2.9 million people require humanitarian assistance, better access to aid, for example, would offer widespread, tangible benefits that are only attainable with reduced conflict and sustained cooperation from armed groups. In other words, the only way to realise these benefits would be to work around a plan and process that is functional (USIP, 2023).

As a further peace dividend that helps to reinforce trust in the accord, it is also vital to notice the expansion of government presence, which previously nearly nonexistent in certain rural zones. This is an important step towards achieving peace. On the other hand, the supply of state services, in especially in the rural areas of the north and east, was a crucial indication of the government's commitment to tackling the persistent regional inequities. A comparable concern was the lack of financing and personnel that the Special Criminal Court, which was established in 2015 and started operating in late 2018, experienced. The court was inaugurated in late 2018.

(vi) Other Roles Played and Efforts at Ending the Crisis

In addition to the regional and international cooperation, a number of nations have also donated their own quotas in order to see the crisis in the CAR through to its conclusion. Although it is possible that this article will not cover all of these nations and all of their efforts, it is necessary to mention the operations of Russia and the United States, both of which have been condemned for their attempt to end the situation.

Russia's Role and the Limitation

In addition to the collaboration on both the regional and international levels, a number of countries have also contributed their own quotas in order to ensure that the crisis in the CAR is resolved in its entirety. Although it is possible that this article will not cover all of these countries and all of their efforts, it is necessary to mention the operations of Russia and the United States, both of which have been criticised for their attempt to put an end to the situation. Both of these nations have been criticised for their attempt to put an end to the situation.

The United States Policy and Aid and Criticism

The United States contributed over 124 million dollars in emergency humanitarian assistance each year during fiscal years 2017 and 2018, making it the single biggest contributor to the humanitarian effort in the Central African Republic. Moreover, the United States has provided help for the prevention of atrocities, the restoration of livelihoods, the settlement of conflicts, the reform of the security sector, and the preservation of the environment. In FY2018, overall bilateral assistance from the United States came to \$34 million, with \$18 million allocated to food aid, \$13 million allocated to security aid, and \$3 million allocated to development aid. Beginning in 2014, while the Central African Republic was still under transitional governance, the United States began providing assistance in the field of security, with an initial focus on the police and judiciary sectors. In 2016, it extended to include programmes to support the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) of rebel fighters. These programmes included professionalization of the military, right-sizing of the military, and defence reform initiatives. For the fiscal year 2020, the Trump administration, for example, asked for \$6.6 million in financing for bilateral assistance that would be managed by the State Department and USAID. In 2017, the Administration supported an increase in MINUSCA's troop cap; but, more recently, it has pushed to restrict U.S. financing for the mission, which is consistent with its larger criticism of U.N. peacekeeping operations. It is fascinating to learn that the financial contributions made by the United States to MINUSCA in FY2018 were \$267 million, and that the amounts of \$157 million and \$163 million have been sought for FY2019 and FY2020, respectively (Tomas, 2019).

CAR's internal armed organisations and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), which had its roots in Uganda but was active in CAR, were both targets of targeted sanctions imposed by the United States when the country decided to withdraw its assistance for the humanitarian programme. The United States has sanctioned sixteen persons and three businesses in the Central African Republic (CAR). This includes former presidents Francois Bozizé and Michel Djotodia, former Seleka commander Nouredine Adam, and LRA leader Joseph Kony, together with two of Kony's sons and the LRA as a group. Also included in this category is Nouredine Adam. The sanctions imposed on the Central African Republic by the committee of the United Nations Security Council were narrower than those imposed by the United States. In 2017, the

United States government decided to withdraw the military advisers that had been providing assistance to Ugandan-led anti-LRA operations in eastern Central African Republic since 2011. Congress also requested that the executive branch develop a policy for the Central African Republic. In 2015, the State Department issued a strategy paper that identified U.S. objectives and highlighted her diplomatic and assistance activities in the Central African Republic. Through the annual foreign aid appropriations measures (most recently, under section 7042 of Public Law 116-6), the United States Congress directed funding for reconciliation as well as peace-building aid in the Central African Republic (CAR), as well as for DDR and early-warning programmes in LRA-affected areas. The conference agreement on Public Law 116-6 contains funding of \$8 million from the State Department's Peacekeeping Operations budget to provide military support to the Central African Republic (CAR). Evidently, the United States' involvement was motivated more by personal concerns than by a desire to aid the CAR (Tomas, 2019). Because of this, the activities did not actively contribute to the mitigation of the problem.

Latest Developments and Efforts on the Central Africa Republic Crisis

Unfortunately, in the run-up to and after the general elections of the 27th of December 2020, armed conflict between Government forces and a coalition of armed groups in several towns of the Central African Republic (CAR) ensued (UNICEF, 2021). The attacks had forced at least 200,000 people – almost half of whom are children – to flee their homes. While many have since returned home, approximately 100,000 people were still displaced (UNICEF, 2021). The situation was volatile in many parts of the country, following the announcement of election results.

This new wave of violence and displacement is increasing humanitarian needs at a time when the Central African people are already dealing with the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and years of conflict and insecurity. For the most vulnerable children and women, fighting is a direct threat to their lives. It is likely to lead to an increase in the incidence of malnutrition among children and gross violations of their rights, such as recruitment or killing (UNICEF, 2021).

Also, 13th of January 2021 marked another period of crisis in the Central Africa Republic. Armed groups under the banner of the Coalition of Patriots for Change (Coalition des Patriotes pour le Changement – CPC) launched attacks on the outskirts of Bangui, the capital city of the Central African Republic (CAR). The six members of the CPC coalition, which was formed in mid-December 2020, were signatories to the 2019 Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the CAR (Accord Politique pour la Paix et la Réconciliation en RCA) signed in February of that year under the auspices of the African Union (AU) and other partners. They were also among the so-called 'Non-State Armed Groups' that currently control the bulk of the country's territory outside the capital city. Prior to the attacks the CPC opposed the proposed presidential and legislative elections and sought to increase insecurity in the country in an attempt to have them postponed. Thus, the coalition conducted attacks, disrupted election campaigns and prevented voting in certain areas (Mohamed, 2021).

The current situation in the Central African Republic (CAR) is being covered in the news in a broad variety of different ways. On February 2, 2021, a study reveals that newly displaced persons who share their accounts of struggle throughout the course of the Central African Republic's decades-long fight for stability was conducted (Aljazeera, 2021a). Yet on February 8, 2021, the United Nations reported that 14 trucks had made it into Bangui after militants had blocked the city's lifeline for the previous

50 days (Aljazeera, 2021b). On the other hand, it was reported that Patrice-Edouard Ngaissona and Alfred Yekatom, both of whom were accused of commanding militias in extensive assaults on Muslims, pleaded not guilty to war crimes before the International Criminal Court trial on February 16, 2021. (Aljazeera, 2021c). Just one day after the trial, reports indicate that the Secretary-General of the United Nations stated that the peacekeeping mission requires a total of 2,750 additional military reinforcements and 940 additional police officers in order to be successful. This is due to the fact that the violence has spread throughout the region (Aljazeera, 2021). At this time, on February 24 of the same year, CAR Prime Minister Firmin Ngrebada says that pro-government forces seized Bossangoa, which is located north of the capital city of Bangui (Aljazeera, 2021c), but a report shows that at least 14 people were killed at a religious site in CAR the following day. As a result, the rights organisation issues a request for investigations in the midst of conflicts between the security forces of the Central African Republic and armed groups (Aljazeera, 2021d).

A news published on March 7, 2021 mentions that thousands of people are trying to escape the bloodshed in the Central African Republic as two individuals compete for the presidency (Aljazeera, 2021e). A research that was released on March 9, 2021 demonstrates how the new CAR violence rendered women more susceptible. As a result of the recent violence in the Central African Republic, female refugees and internally displaced people have been kidnapped, and women in general are in a particularly precarious position (Aljazeera, 2021f). Further updates on the CAR issue continue to wreak havoc around the nation. This covers the second round of parliamentary elections, which took place under the cloud of violence. In point of fact, there will be runoff elections in 49 districts, while first-round voting will take place in 69 districts where violence prevented voting in December (Aljazeera, 2021a). As of the time that this article was written, the situation has not been given a solution that is permanent, and in the meanwhile, violence and instability have continued to rip across the country.

- ***New Provisions and Prospect for the Central Africa Crisis***

Since a violent coup d'état took place in the Central African Republic in 2013, the country has been in a state of upheaval. In the aftermath of the conflict, armed factions were able to reach a number of peace deals, despite the fact that they continued to engage in combat with one another and wage assaults against the civilian population. New expectations for peace have been raised as a result of a recent deal that was sponsored by the African Union and signed in February 2019 by the administration as well as fourteen armed factions. Despite this, there has been no letup in the violence, and the level of political tension is once again on the increase (International Crisis Group, 2023). In the previous chapter, we discussed a variety of responses to the crisis; but, these responses are not sufficient to put an end to the crisis in a way that is long-lasting. This chapter, in conjunction with the philosophy of crisis management, provides suggestions for actions that may be taken to terminate the crisis. Naturally, the large number of accords that were covered in the chapter before this one gives the impression that the emphasis may have been focused on signing deals rather than seeing them as a foundation for a complicated peace process. This is a possibility. In addition, it would seem that the lessons that should have been learnt from the ineffective implementation of agreements have not been learned. Since the signing of the Bangui peace accord in 1997, which included provisions for a government of national unity, the disarmament of mutinous soldiers and armed civilians, the securitization of Bangui, and a national

conference of reconciliation, the core components of subsequent peace agreements have remained largely unchanged (Mohamed, 2015).

Despite this, the process of crisis management calls for a wide variety of abilities and competence (Khaled & Tevhide, 2018). This is essential to assure a process of altering reality and persuading public opinion of the group's point of view, which protects the group's vision and interests in the process. In addition, the management of a crisis calls for the conveyance of essential social, legal, and other types of information in the pursuit of potential solutions (Khaled & Tevhide, 2018). In a nation like the Central African Republic, the combination of this strategy with a management philosophy that is tailored to the nature and scale of the crisis is likely to result in a peace that is long-lasting and the restoration of order.

(i) Crisis Management Theory for Resolving Central Africa Republic Crisis

In the most basic sense, a crisis scenario produces a need for knowledge, and communication is the means by which that need might be satisfied. Moreover, neither the crisis management plan nor the crisis communication protocols should be disregarded before, during, or after a crisis has occurred. The target audiences for crisis communication might be either internal or external to the organisation that is experiencing the crisis. It offers information, which ought to remain constant throughout the whole of the crisis scenario thanks to the selection of a principal spokesman (Khaled & Tevhide, 2018).

"Crisis knowledge management" and "stakeholder reaction management" are the two categories that Coombs identifies as being under the umbrella of "crisis communication." The act of gathering information, doing analysis on that information, communicating what has been learnt, and making decisions are all components of "crisis knowledge management." The term "stakeholder reaction management" refers to the process of attempting to persuade various stakeholder groups inside an organisation by means of communication (Coombs, 2019). According to Khaled and Tevhide (2018), the theoretical frameworks of crisis management may be gleaned from an examination of the crisis communication research papers published in *Journal of Public Relations Review* and *Public Relations Review* between the years 1975 and 2006. In crisis communication research, the following theories are utilised: situational crisis communication theory; issue and crisis management theory; image restoration theory; apology theory; attribution theory; contingency theory; situational theory; organisational theory; and furthermore, the research uncovers additional theories such as the excellence theory; the diffusion and innovation theory; the self-disclosure theory; the chaos theory; the commodity theory; the stakeholder theory; and post-crisis stakeholder theory (Khaled & Tevhide, 2018). It's interesting to note that the theories of crisis management come from public relations and management, and they also include certain rhetorical ideas like the apology theory and image restoration theory.

As was said before, this article will take the position that situational crisis communication theory is the best approach to understanding how the crisis might be resolved. So, it follows that the situational crisis communication theory is the one that the present researcher considers to be the most viable option for finding a solution to the CAR dilemma (SCCT). The explanations of this idea are summarised here for your convenience. The attribution theory has been expanded upon by Coombs and Holladay in their situational crisis communication theory, which is an extension of that theory. The guiding principle behind SCCT is the notion that businesses should formulate their

responses to a crisis scenario on the basis of an awareness of the manner in which the general public places blame for the problem. If the general public believes that an institution was more intentionally responsible for a catastrophe, then that organisation will be held more accountable for the disaster, and vice versa. The SSCT is used in the process of evaluating various crisis response solutions. It is crucial to note that SCCT is a theory that focuses on the audience and that it is continually evolving (Coombes and Holladay, 2019).

In order to have a better understanding of the issue, we need to go back to the beginning of the problem. It is possible that an expedition to the narrative ought to be planned if it has not yet been recounted. This is helpful information in determining how the general public places blame for the situation, which may then be used to develop a solution. As a result of this being at the back of our minds, the following advice is consequently put up in an appropriate manner.

(ii) Prospects for the Central Africa Republic Crisis

Despite of the myriad of explanations that have been presented to explain why the peace process has been unsuccessful, it is important to note that each of these reasons has, in its own way, helped to alleviate the strain of the crisis and to minimise the violent character of it. Certain observations, such as the fact that the head of state also serves as the leader of his political party in the nation, contributed to the deterioration of the situation. For instance, in order to get a presidential majority, one must first assume the role of the majority's leader. This entails having an unchallengeable grip on the legislative body. This is a significant break from the notion of the separation of powers and a parody of democracy in action (Azou-Passonda, et. al., 2018). As a result, the crisis in the Central African Republic eventually damaged the foundations of the country as well as the morale of its people as well as the legitimacy of the institutions that were engaged.

It is interesting to note that the failure of the peace process is also tied to the absence of institutional changes as well as the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) process. The institutional changes that attempt to strengthen and democratise public institutions in order to prevent hostilities from reviving have not been successful despite the efforts that have been made to attain this goal. The DDR, which seeks to accomplish the complete disengagement of the members of the armed groups, is taken into consideration during institutional changes, which included entailed reforming the security sector. Reforms in the security sector have only just lately gotten under way, and there is still a lot of work to be done. The administration of justice is another essential factor contributing to the failure of peace efforts in the Central African Republic. Since 1997, the regimes have avoided making the administration of justice the primary focus of post-conflict issues; this is not helping the situation. Their motive is influenced by the fact that the majority of these schemes were responsible for the organisations at some time during the crisis. These armed groups have been accused of massive breaches of human rights, including international crimes. By offering amnesty to the individuals who are a part of the armed organisations that they are fighting, they are granting amnesty to themselves (Azou-Passonda, et. al., 2018).

The current situation in the Central African Republic (CAR) has resulted in a brutal struggle between pastoralists and agricultural communities, which has been aggravated by the sectarian violence that has been going on in the country. Farmers are more likely to be Christians or animists, but pastoralists are more likely to be Muslims.

Though difficulties did exist between these two groups, interdependence between the two communities might help defuse those tensions and facilitate reconciliation between farmers and pastoralists. In spite of the fact that earlier attempts on this front have been unsuccessful, our introduction would assist to put an end to the situation. In addition to this, the religious leaders of the Central African Republic have the potential to contribute to the process of stabilisation and reconciliation provided they get enough assistance. It is imperative that we do not forget that the majority of the populace holds these leaders in very high esteem. Their function is especially significant at the local level, but it is equally significant at the national level. Unfortunately, there is a paucity of data on their effect, and this has to be repaired. Decentralized government, as proposed by several other writers, might be an effective response to the situation in the CAR. Bangui has been the epicentre of CAR's economic and political activity for as long as the country's government and institutions for maintaining law and order have been centralised there. Tomety (2010) suggests that armed groups have been able to proliferate in the country because there has been a chronic absence of state governance and institutions, as well as a lack of territorial management policies for social and economic development outside of Bangui. These factors have allowed for the proliferation of armed groups in the country (Tomety, 2010).

The fact that armed factions chose to focus their attention on Bangui as the main political and economic centre of the country was significant. It would be beneficial to encourage democracy on the local level. With the current situation in the CAR, young people have been recruited to help spread violence. Creating programmes to get young people back into the workforce, which would contribute to the country's economic and social growth, would dissuade many young people from joining armed organisations and contribute to the country's stabilisation and recovery. It is important to keep in mind that the average age of CAR's population is low. In addition to this, the nation can grow and restore its economy by capitalising on the 15 million hectares of rich agricultural land it has as well as the 70 percent of its rural population that is engaged in agricultural activities. If the nation could focus on developing its agriculture policy, things would go more smoothly here. Developing this essential industry obviously has the potential to enhance people's lives in rural regions and minimise the risk of food insecurity. According to Tomety (2010), a research conducted in 2010 found that the overwhelming majority of former fighters were eager to restart occupations related to agriculture (Tomety, 2010). This, in turn, may reflect a greater ability for peaceful reintegration, which is something that should be investigated. Improvements may be made to the working circumstances of artisanal miners, allowing for the establishment of capacities for peaceful employment. Large-scale job creation projects in agriculture and infrastructure, reviewing arrangements for natural resource extraction to ensure that best practises are followed, and that may offer significant opportunities for economic development are all things that could help contribute to the stabilisation and recovery of the economy. In accordance with the recommendation made by Amnesty International (2015a), efforts should be made to facilitate the safe return and resettlement of Muslim refugees. This should include the promotion of initiatives to resolve issues regarding property ownership and occupation, as well as the rehabilitation of damaged and destroyed property. In addition to this, the culture of impunity that is prevalent today, together with the implementation of an efficient transitional justice programme, has the potential to make a significant contribution to the ongoing efforts towards recovery and peace (Amnesty International, 2015a). The national judicial system has to be strengthened in order to establish the ability to

properly investigate and punish human rights breaches, according to several observers, who have appealed for international cooperation to this end (Amnesty International, 2015a). This is another thing that is advised. The subject of disarmament and demobilisation is not one that should be avoided at all costs. Destabilizing factors include, but are not limited to, the presence of armed organisations over an extended period of time and the availability of firearms. Helping to stabilise the country would require expanding participation in DDR programmes to include a wider variety of combatant groups, bolstering the ability of national security forces, with the assistance of international partners, to deal peacefully with tensions, and improving the efficacy of disarmament programmes. All of these things could be accomplished with international support.

CONCLUSION

There is a lack of consistency in the theories and practises of crises in international relations and in the international system. One of the reasons for this is because researches are looking at the involvement and effect of the international community in the CAR crisis as against analysing from diplomatic viewpoints.

A foundational understanding of the international conflict studies that pertain to the country under discussion is presented. It shows representative numbers for one of the aspects that was shown to be a contributing factor in the crisis. Thus, the construction of such a geographical and historical picture.

The development and crisis process that has been occurring in the Central African Republic since 2012 was analysed. It discussed the actions and people involved in the crisis, as well as how it had developed up to 2020. As a direct result of this, the crisis never stops looking for new reasons to seize onto. The actors are continuing to take part using a variety of violent techniques and making some headway towards peace. Despite the fact that some of the Internally Displaced People (IDPs) have fled to a neighbouring country for safety, the international humanitarian communities continue to provide aid to those affected.

In terms of the proportion of the overall population that comprises those in need of humanitarian assistance, the situation in the Central African Republic (CAR) continues to rank as one of the most severe in the world. The emergency appeal of UNICEF was only financed to the extent of 49% in the year 2020, leaving crucial financial shortages in areas such as health and HIV, child protection, as well as water and sanitation (UNICEF, 2023). Notwithstanding the efforts that have been made to put an end to the problem, it is still a threat to the nation. It therefore necessitates an additional effort.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Here, I borrow some facts from the analysis and recommendation of Beninga, Manga, & Mogba, (2018). Their categorical recommendation suits the specific recommendations intend to advance forward to parties on how to stop the Central Africa Republic crisis. Thus, I agree with them in some of their recommendations.

The Government

Reforming FACA should be one of the first things the administration does to guarantee a peaceful Central African Republic. Beninga, Manga, and Mogba (2018) indicated that

foreign partners, the government, armed groups, and the public all see the army as vital. This is the one understanding in order to act area where they all agree, and it is the only area where they can work together. A lot of challenging choices need to be made in order for the military to emerge as a potential unifying force for the country. This involves integrating certain militia groups into the regular armed forces, improving the quality of military training, and removing restrictions on the availability of firearms. If the government is prevented from purchasing and possessing weapons, it will be impossible for it to successfully fight against armed groups or negotiate with them. When these three prerequisites have been satisfied, the Armée de la République Centrafricaine (ARC) will have a need for further professional trainings (Beninga, 2015). It is imperative that both men and women from every region of the nation have access to enlisting in the armed forces. After their training, members of this professional army would instantly be distributed over the whole of the nation to ensure that insurgent armed organisations are unable to retake territory they previously held. It is also crucial for the government that the judicial system be reformed and that court judgements be enforced in the appropriate manner. Obviously, a significant amount of money over a long period of time would need to be invested in order to reform the court system. The nation would have to start from scratch in terms of constructing the required physical infrastructure and instructing judicial personnel. Even though criminal proceedings began in 2015 and have continued during President Touadera's tenure, the painfully slow pace at which they are proceeding is evidence of the numerous challenges that are currently being faced by the courts, particularly in the area of protecting victims and witnesses. These, in the long run, have led to the dismissal of cases, as well as the release of well-known and violent offenders. Those who have been found guilty of crimes need to have their penalties carried out in a manner that is fair and just. In addition to this, the government is obligated to carry out the terms of the Oslo agreement and hasten the establishment of the international criminal tribunal (Beninga, 2015). I share the viewpoint expressed before. In addition, in order to maintain the rule of law, the judicial system need to be granted as much independence as is feasible. In the system, political interference and any other kind of influence from the outside should be eliminated.

In addition to the aforementioned recommendations, another one that has been made to the government is that it should periodically evaluate the mandates of the international missions, particularly MINUSCA. This is so that the government will be able to take corrective actions when they are required, and so that there will not be any conflicts between the goals of the government and those of the population and the priorities of the international partners. In a similar vein, the establishment of a coordinating and finance agency that would pool financial resources that might be cooperatively handled by development partners is a necessary step. In conclusion, the establishment of state institutions in every part of the nation will assist the federal government in addressing problems on a more fundamental level. In spite of the fact that this is true, it is of the utmost importance to improve educational facilities in all remote places in order to assist in the education of a large number of young people who lack education and to prevent them from being recruited by armed organisations. In addition to the broad advice of how they may be given the authority to revive the economy, here is a suggestion.

The Civil Society

The population of people who are not part of the militias makes up the civil society. The majority of those who make up the civil society were injured throughout the conflict. But, in order to do so, they would need to keep the nationalist spirit alive and take a stance for the sovereignty of their state. In addition, in order to construct a powerful country, they are required to work together with the appropriate government and get proper training in order to strengthen both their technical and operational capabilities. They should also make an effort to gather their resources so that they can speak with authority when presenting ideas for a peaceful society in the Central African Republic. This would allow them to more effectively advocate for peaceful alternatives.

The Political Parties

It should come as no surprise that the position of political parties has been fraught with difficulty. Hence, the election process will give birth to a trustworthy democratically organised nation if they are able to work for the common good and educate the people on the significance of winning power via elections rather than through violence. In order to accomplish this goal, political parties must refrain from providing support to local militias and must vigorously denounce any exactions made by such organisations.

The International Communities

While the peacekeeping mission, as well as the aid and efforts at ensuring peace from the outside and from the inside, continue, the international community, organisation, and other external institutions and actors should collaborate more closely with the government to disarm groups and evaluate the work of international missions. Always putting the needs of the people ahead of other considerations should be a priority. In a same manner, they should coordinate the mediation efforts and unify the viewpoints of the several mediators (Angola, Chad, Congo, Gabon, and the Catholic community of Sant'Egidio), on the future of warlords, rebel fighters, and the return of previous heads of state (Beninga, 2015). Yet, the continuance of support for structural, reform, and investment programmes at both the national and municipal levels is important to putting an end to the crisis and getting back on our feet. Moreover, the African Union, the Economic Community of Central African States, and the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) should not become tired of helping the populace and organising assistance from their member states. They should also assist in the "demobilisation" of armed groups in an irreversible manner.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Crisis Map of CAR



Appendix 2: UN Soldiers on a peace keeping Mission in CAR



Appendix 3: A Crisis Scene at the CAR

