# Anekantvada, Post-structuralism and Multiculturalism

SANJAY GOYAL
Department of English
Jain Vishva Bharati University (Deemed University)
Ladnun, India

**Abstract:**

 The basic principles of Anekanta, multiculturalism, and post-structuralism profess many-sidedness and respect for plurality. But it does not mean that anything and everything should be welcome. Perverse actions cannot be welcome but they can be understood and modified. With understanding, transformations do happen. 'Everything' does not include 'perverted' and 'sick' notions. It is but pragmatic to have certain social standards even though one should be free in one's mind as it helps one run the society smoothly. Not everyone is of the same level. A standard social blue print helps them identify things better. One cannot dismiss them on the grounds of manysidedness. On the contrary, what should be stressed is the point that one should not blindly and rigidly follow the set standards. Always, there should be the freedom and flexibility to cut through the set norms if it does not facilitate the promotion of justice.

**Key words**: Anekanta, Jainism, plurality, multiperspectivism, relativism

 Lao Tzu says that 'Truth' cannot be said and what is said is not an absolute truth. His words are economical and effective. The most important book of Jainas is *Tattvarta Sutra* which means 'That which is'. That is a beautiful definition of 'truth'. Truth is that 'isness'. Though the 'isness' does not define anything, it is the very definition of truth, the most beautiful and accurate. Truth is 'That Which Is'. This is the very paradox of life which is very near and is also very far. The philosophy of

Anekantavada holds, in the same way, that a substance has so many aspects in it that it is impossible to exhaust them. Secondly, contradictions can and have to co-exist. Co-existence of opposites is the most important principle of Anekantavada. In fact, Anekantavada argues that it is the opposites that keep life intact. Life will disappear with the disappearance of opposites as black exists as long as white is there; black will no longer exist if white disappears. Postmodernism is essential to sustain life, as that is the way of contemporary life. Life thrives in contradictions, as Acharya Mahapragya very rightly writes in this direction:

> Our life is based on opposing pairs. If the opposition between pairs was to disappear, so would life. According to Hatha yoga, life is defined as the combination of inhalation and exhalation. There are five types of pranas. Of them, one is prana and other is apana. As long as the opposing directions are maintained, there is life. When this order is broken, life is broken. The breaking of life or death means the expulsion of both these energies. When opposing movements, or when the two directional movements become one, life comes to an end. (2001, 5)

Life operates in a non-absolutistic way; absolutism is thus a suicidal tendency. If life has many opposing pairs in it, it will be unfair not to have them in the philosophy of life, as the philosophy should be the reflection of reality. But our logic fails to notice this, as logic does not entertain contradictions. This problem of 'not being able to allow plurality' is the hallmark of the Enlightenment period. Jain philosophers formulated Anekantavada on the basis of their experience and logic. Tarka and Vada are the most important elements in both Jainism and Buddhism. One cannot even look at a small stone from one's point of view in its totality. If one looks at certain sides of the stone, certain sides will remain unseen. So Anekanta is not a very abstruse idea. It can be formulated if one is very conscious and aware of oneself and one's environment. Mahapragya further writes in this context:

> Anekanta stands for the right vision. It enables us to comprehend the true nature of an object, which is possessed of the infinite attributes of reality. According to Jaina, reality is multidimensional. It has many facets and qualities. So it is very difficult to comprehend the true nature of reality in its entirety. Accordingly, only a particular aspect of an object is

comprehended by an onlooker. He, therefore, gives an estimate of reality from a particular standpoint. (2002, ix)

Lord Mahavira says 'Reality is relative.' And it has to be so. It should be so. After all, scholars from different disciplines hold different points of view. For instance, one can talk about the concept of man. Sociologists would claim that man is a social animal. Psychoanalysts, especially Freudians, would claim that man is a sexual animal. Marx would agree with Freud in one respect: he would agree with Freud in asserting that man is not the master in his own house and driven by the unconscious. But, Marx would disagree with Freud in the issue of the content of unconscious. He would rather say that the unconscious primarily comprises the economic superstructure and not just the id.

Carl Jung will fly in front of Freud and say that man is not just governed by id but also by the collective unconscious. Sartre's existentialism will outrightly deny the existence of the unconscious. Biologists would say that man is an animal and he is as instinctual as other animals and his behavior is modified but not disconnected from the instinctual sources. One can easily see here that different disciplines hold different perspectives on human nature. All of them are partially true but nothing is absolutely wrong and entirely right. Achaya Tulsi observes:

> This is in fact only a partial truth about an object and if the person asserts in the like manner then he is not looking upon this standpoint as the only true standpoint. This goes well so far as he admits his limitations. The fact of the matter is that he understands that there may be a multitude of different viewpoints of a given situation or event and all those viewpoints in their totality reflect the full nature of the situation or event. And hence, unless we take into account all the different aspects of a thing we cannot be in a position to comprehend it fully as also to express it correctly and completely. (1985, ix)

As a matter of fact, the concept of man cannot be explained from one standpoint. In order to arrive at a more comprehensive viewpoint of the concept of man, it would be necessary to analyze and then synthesize all the viewpoints. Anekanta was the fruit of this stupendous endeavour, which is

very arduous but fruit bearing, as Nagin J. Shah appropriately writes.

> It wants us to find out and see for ourselves truth inherent in every view idea or system and to understand it with its full logic and then to synthesize or reconcile it with other difficult even contradictory views, ideas or systems, resolving the oppositions or contradiction. It takes care not only to demonstrate that truths of different views, ideas or systems are relative and partial but also to relate and reconcile those truths properly and intelligently in order to arrive at a more and more comprehensive, concrete and higher truth. This is the reason why Jaina philosophy considers itself as a synthesis of different systems of philosophy. So it became imperative on the upholders of Anekantavada to study and understand as many philosophical systems as possible and then to attempt their synthesis. They should not neglect any philosophical system, Indian or otherwise. Their task is stupendous and rewarding. (2002, xi)

## Post-Structuralism: Instability in the Human Sciences

Post-structuralism is a movement which owes its existence to its predecessor, structuralism, on which it is dependent and from which it takes a lot of theoretical standpoints. Even though post-structuralism takes much from structuralism, it denies much of what structuralism claims. Post-structuralism is very skeptical of the foundation of knowledge and sets in motion a world of radical uncertainty. To understand Deconstruction better, it will be essential to take a quick detour of the historical background in which Deconstruction grew.

Seeing the instability in meaning, scholars started attending to how words mean more than what thus mean. Increasingly distrustful of language claiming to convey only a single authorization message – they began exploring how words can convey many different meanings simultaneously. Thus Friedrich Nietzsche was the first postmodern poststructuralist with his deep-gnawing doubts about languages. Robinson clearly observes:

> Nietzsche also saw languages as the key player in a continual process of human deception. Words are what we think with and we often automatically assure that there are entities 'out there' to which they refer. Words are useful to us because we

can use them to simplify and freeze the chaos and complexities of our surroundings, but that is all they can do. Not only will our grammar control the way in which our thoughts are organized, but more drastically, it will determine what sorts of thoughts it is possible for us to have. (2005, 17)

When these things were happening in France, Ferdinand de Saussure came onto the scene. Saussure made it very clear that language has no connection whatsoever with reality. Saussure argued that the relationship between 'words' and 'their meaning' is arbitrary. This only strengthened the doubts which were strongly articulated by Nietzsche. Roman Jakobson was one of those thinkers who were deeply influenced by the Saussurean analysis of language. Thus Saussure's ideas became popular. Saussure's ideas influenced two important people who are called 'poststructuralists', Jacques Lacan and Jacques Derrida. Jacques Lacan, Jacques Derrida and Foucault are the three important exponents of the movement called post structuralism.

It is interesting to note that similar ideas were developed in different corners of the world at almost the same period of time.. Thus 'New criticism' in America and 'practical criticism' in England prioritized the study of form by calling our attention to the medium. To this period there belongs Empson's book 'Seven Types of Ambiguity'. Empson zeroed down on the slipperiness of language and by doing so paved the way for poststructuralism. However, Empson was of the view that context binds the otherwise fleeting meaning of a text. But for this, Empson's work is in every respect a post-structuralist text. Peter Barry says in his book, *Beginning Theory*:

> Empson's basic attitude to language is that it is a slippery medium indeed; when we handle language, we need to be aware that the whole thing is likely to explode into meanings we hadn't suspected of being there at all. As we go from ambiguity type one to type seven, we seem to be approaching the frontiers of language, where the territory eventually becomes unmappable, and we seem to end up looking into a void of linguistic indeterminacy. This can be seen as an anticipation from within the British tradition of post structuralist views about the unreliability of language as a medium. But the placing of language within any context naturally tends to reduce or eliminate ambiguity (1999, 30).

Saussure, like the Anglo-American formalists and Russian formalists, focused his attention on language, trying to understand how language as such functions. He posited that language is a system of signs and a sign comprises a signifier and a signified. A sign is like a paper and the signifier and the signified constitute the two sides of it. A sign does not deal with the referent. The relationship between the signifier and the referent is arbitrary. To be more precise, it is both arbitrary and fixed.

Saussure's structuralism already called into question the efficacy of language in representing reality. But structuralism advocated that one can find out the structure which makes meaning possible. Meaning is created via difference and thus structuralism takes a postmodern stand. Ward also remarks on the same idea:

> Because there is no natural or inevitable bond between words and things, Saussure saw languages as an arbitrary system. From this starting point, structuralist and eventually postmodernist – theory abandoned any question of 'truth' language; it argues that language can never be a transparent or innocent reflection of realists. (2007, 90)

## Multiculturalism: A pathway for Pluralism

At the advent of globalization, cultural diversities are meeting together and it is essential that they have to find a suitable path for their existence, expression and furtherance. When it takes place in an amicable way, it causes reasons to construct a multicultural society. The level of intimacy in the cultures is such that no culture can keep itself an alien one, and if it is done (though it is not possible), that culture is bound to be eclipsed. Because of the many changes in the world order in the last decades, people have been trying to mix up with the other cultures, languages, traditions and so forth. People are also no longer rigid these days as they have come to understand the principle of "the more, the better" and they try to assimilate diverse things, as much as possible. It is not a weakness, but a strength of the personality or rather a demand of time. Experience teaches us that the rigidity is suicidal and reality is relative therefore it has become quite evident that one has to support other's culture in order to save his own. The profound statement of Lord Mahavira "Reality is Relative" propounds the

importance of plurality in life. As the scenario and ways of the world are changing drastically, we need to develop a sense of pluralism in our life styles.

The recent changes in the world order have therefore paved the way for various cultural societies; multiculturalism is often considered a mixture of diverse cultures where different identities get mixed up. It is a way to accept plurality in every walk of life. It is the single important factor which promotes the existence of multiple cultures and democratic way of styles in its aftermath. Multiculturalism has a relationship with communities containing multiple cultures:

> The term 'multiculturalism' is used in two broad ways, either descriptively or normatively. As a descriptive term, it usually refers to the simple fact of cultural diversity: it is generally applied to the demographic make-up of a specific place, sometime at the organizational level, e.g. schools, businesses, neighborhoods, cities, or nations. As a normative term, it refers to ideologies or policies that promote this diversity or its institutionalization; in this sense, multiculturalism is a society at ease with the rich tapestry of human life and the desire amongst people to express their own identity in the manner they see it (Wikipedia 2012).

These kinds of ideologies or policies are included from country to country, ranging from the advocacy of equal respect to the various cultures in a society. Cultural isolation, centering on cultural uniqueness, can protect the uniqueness of the local culture of a nation or area and also contribute to global cultural diversity since the mixture with the other countries, i.e. cultures, have become an inevitable part of life today, which can't be ignored and which gives birth to the concept of multiculturalism. As a matter of fact, Multiculturalism is nothing but an anekantic (non-absolutistic) way of life among the existence of many cultures.

## Anekantavada: An ever opened way for Discussion

Anekantavada holds that a particular object has innumerable attributes and, as a result, even contradictory elements can coexist in the very same object. It seems to nullify logic but it is not illogical. Logic is the product of human mind and existence or reality is too big and enormous to be measured

and judged by logic alone. Man is both logical and illogical and he is governed by both rational and irrational factors. Man, as a whole, is then both describable and indescribable. Logic follows the path of a straight line but existence seems to follow no fixed path. It sometimes goes via the expected path and sometimes it goes by its own logic, which is beyond the logic of human intellect. It may be even wrong to say that it is illogical. As human beings are not able to understand the logic behind it, it does not make existence illogical. The possibility of our mind being incapable of understanding is also involved there. It would be better, in that case, to call it supralogical than illogical.

Jaina philosophy is an attempt to understand that 'metalogical' factor. Jaina Acharyas proposed Anekanta on the grounds of certain premises:

1) The premises of identity and difference.
2) The premises of one and many
3) The premises of existence and non- existence
4) The premises of permanence and impermanence
5) The premises of universal and particular

One should understand that these premises are propounded to explain the co-existence of contradictions in the same object. Co-existence of opposites is the core principle of Anekantvada. Acharya Mahapragya stresses this connection:

> The earth is a substance and a pot is its mode. A pot is made of earth and as it cannot be produced without it, it is identical with the earth. The earth cannot exercise the function of holding water before it is transformed into a pot, which therefore is functionally different from earth. A pot is a product and earth is its material cause, in other words earth is the substance of which the pot is a mode. The relation between the substance and its mode is identity cum difference. It therefore follows that an effect and a cause are related through identity and difference. (2001, 12)

When one describes identity, description of difference becomes inevitable. After all, identity is made by difference. If difference disappears, identity will not be possible. For instance, if one wants to describe 'good', how is it possible to describe it without referring to 'bad'? It will be next to

impossible to do it. They are so inextricably interwoven that it cannot be separated. Mark Curry aptly observes:

> I have explained (difference as the opposite of sameness) difference through the concept of difference, in that I pointed out to the difference between it and another word. Or I defined it negatively, in relation to its opposite, as if the meaning of its opposite were given in nature and could act as a foundation for any other word that related to it. In fact I tried to explain the meaning of 'sameness', I would find it very difficult to do it without reference to the concept of difference, so that its solidity as a foundation is compromised and my definition becomes rather circular. My definition of difference has nowhere to rest, and I find it rebounding between one word and the other indefinitely. (2011, 57)

These two qualities are inseparable. After all, one identifies an object only by its salient features. And salient features are those which are not present in other objects. Then the denial of the object bearing both identity and difference cannot be denied. If one denies the presence of both in an object, it becomes impossible to speculate as to how identification takes place. The absence of difference flattens things and it would be unthinkable to talk of anything. Mark Currie rightly writes:

> The opposition of identity and difference is slightly more complex because identity is synonymous with both sameness and difference. The dictionary defines identity as both 'absolute sameness and individuality'. The slippage here derives from an ambiguity about the points of comparison and antithesis that are in operation. Identity can clearly mean the property of absolute sameness between separate entities, but it can also mean the unique characteristics determining the personality and difference of a single entity. In itself this points to a view that this is also reached through a labyrinth of linguistic, cultural theory; that the identity of things, people groups, nations and cultures is constituted by the logics of both sameness and difference. (2011, 112)

Thus identity and difference are both present in an object. They may seem to be contradictory but as a matter of fact they are not. Identity and difference are complementary to each other.  As one has noticed, with identity, difference also has to be taken into account. Without identity, difference

cannot be pinned down and vice versa. They are bound in the very same object. In the same way, a particular object is both existent and non-existent at the same time. If difference and identity are understood as binding principles, so is the case with existence and non- existence. An object is existent from one point of view and 'non-existent' from another point of view. If one says that only existence is true, he but holds an idea, which is only partially true. Acharya Mahapragya emphasizes:

> Acharya Akalanka has mentioned a number of reasons for the admission of existence and non-existence. A pot exists with reference to its own nature; it does not exist with reference to an alien nature. This argument leads us to investigate the meaning of 'own nature' and 'alien nature'. Akalanka's reply is that the own nature refers to the things that are responsible for the application of the 'pot concept' and the 'pot word', and what is not amenable to such usage is the alien nature. The affirmation of the own nature and the denial of the alien nature establish the reality of a thing. (2002, 7)

One cannot say that only existence is real. Of course, to say that only existence is real is to refuse to peep into the nature of reality. If existence is true, non-existence must be equally true. The very word 'existence' requires and implies non-existence. Without non-existence, what value does existence have? How can one talk about existence without ever talking about non-existence? This fallacy is identical to the fallacies committed by the Absurdists. Scholars who belong to the Absurd School claim that life is meaningless. But they failed to analyze their sentence logically. If they claim that life as such is meaningless, how can they come up with the idea of 'meaning' as meaninglessness needs a predisposed meaning to be understood as meaninglessness? Without such a meaning to compare with, it is impossible to utter that life is meaningless. They only say that life is, in their viewpoint, meaningless, as it does not match their own pre-conceived meaning. In the same vein, negating non-existence automatically negates existence, which cannot be negated. Satkari Mookarjee observes:

> The parts (of which the pen is made up) do not, taken by themselves, possess the pen character, but the pen is not absolutely different from the parts, as it has no being outside them. As viewed in other relations the pen is not a pen. The pen is a substance but substance is not the pen. The terms 'being' and 'non-being' as elements in formula have thus to be

understood in a very restricted sense i.e. only in relation to a definite context which can be known from experience alone. … Experience certifies the dual nature of entities, viz., existence in terms of its own individuality and non-existence apart from and outside this nature. (1985)

Looking from another point of view, one understands that 'change' can be perceived only when one is at rest. When everything is changing continuously, change will not be perceived. To 'perceive' change, at least one point should be at rest. If one sits on a train and look at the trees, one feels as if the trees are moving fast. As a matter of fact, they are stationary. Only the movement of the train makes it appear so. Movement could be felt at that time because one object is moving and the other is stationary. When two things are moving continuously, one cannot feel the movement at all. An unchanging point is required to perceive change. If everything were in a flux, then how would one understand that everything is in a flux? As a result, Jainas propose that both permanence and impermanence are the aspects of the truth. Acharya Mahapragya writes in this context:

Non-absolutism however does not admit the absolute validity of any one of these alternatives. According to it, neither permanence independent of impermanence nor impermanence independent of permanence is the whole truth. Both are true relatively. There is no creation, according to kundakunda, without creation and no creation cum destruction without continuity or eternity. The synthesis of the three i.e. creation, destruction and continuity is the truth. (2001, 5)

Accordingly, Anekantavada is a synthesis of all discordant elements as it accepts all of them. Anekantavada claims that every discourse has an element of truth and one must synchronize them in order to arrive at a greater truth. Thus, the synthesized version of truth will be a step forward towards wisdom. The concomitance of one and many follows the concomitance of permanence and impermanence. A particular object is one from the point of view of entity. But the entity consists of so many things. The oneness of the entity came to pass because of its identity cum difference as an entity and 'manyness' of the entity came to pass because of the ingredients, which gave birth to the entity as such. So looking

at from one angle i.e. the angle of entity one may say that the entity is one. But when one looks at from the point of view of what it consists of, one has to say that it is many. Thus, both 'oneness and manyness' co-exist in an object. Acharya Mahapragya writes:

> The universal is two-fold –the horizontal and the vertical. The proposition 'I am one', refers to the horizontal universal, which is the experience of unity, pervasiveness and essence. The preposition I am many in respect of the successive functions of my consciousness represents the vertical universe. There is experience of before and after in it. The horizontal universe is the essence pervading through the different contemporary states, which establishes their unity. The vertical universe consists in successive changes that are similar, which establishes a unity running through the past, present and future. (2002, 13)

Looking at the concomitance of one and many from the viewpoint of psychology helps one understand the issue better. 'Man is a crowd' says Heidegger. Man's mind is a mystery. There are umpteen numbers of hypotheses on human mind. Everyone has an intuitive feeling that one is pulled by different forces in different angles. This creates chaos and confusion. An excerpt from Thomas A. Harris will throw light on the issue at hand:

> Throughout history one impression of human nature has been consistent. That man has a multiple nature. This been expressed mythologically, philosophically and religiously. Always, it has been seen as a conflict, the conflict between good and devil, the lower nature and the higher nature, the inner man and the outer man. 'There are times' said Somerset Maugham, 'when I look over the various parts of my character with perplexity, I recognize that I am made up of several persons and that the person that at the moment has the upper hand will inevitably give place to another. But which is the real one? All of them or none.' (1995, 79)

The following dialogue between Somila and Mahavira would further clarify the issue from the viewpoint of Anekantavada. (Excerpt from Acharya Mahapragya)

> Somila: are you one or many, O lord?
> Mahavira: I am one, in respect of substance. O Somila, however, in respect of knowledge and intuition, I am two. In respect of parts (constituents of a substance) I am immutable,

eternal and unchanging. I am many in respect of the ever-changing phases of my consciousness. (2001, 13)

## Conclusion

Hence it can be seen that the Anekantavada was propounded on the basis of the above said premises and multiplicity of ideas. When post-structuralism reached the conclusion of many-sidedness and uncertainty of truth, after having gone through the logical path of analysis of objects and nature, Anekanta reached the same points by synthesizing and analyzing all the philosophies. Post-structuralism, Multiculturalism and Anekantavada prefer respect for plurality and respect for peaceful co-existence of different philosophies, cultures and systems. The implications are very clear. Glenn Ward also writes:

> The implications seem to be that everyone's ideas and values are equally valid. Hence there is no reason to suppose that western or enlightenment beliefs should hold away over any other possible worldview. 'We' have no moral high ground from which to criticize 'their' actions. Nor are 'their' views any more valid than 'ours'. We will never and nor should we, because it could only be achieved by coercion, arrive at universally agreed norms. For Lyotard, society can never be an organic whole; it is a mesh of incommensurable languages. So the ideal of shared standards is put aside in favor of pluralism. (2003, 109)

Post-structuralism and Anekantavada admit that it is not possible to arrive at a 'grand unified theory'. Ultimate reality will always remain unfathomable. It would be impossible to come to know whether one has understood 'reality' because falsifiability is one of the crucial factors, which proves the scientificity of a proposition. If a proposition is not falsifiable, it is not scientific. Sampson flatly denies Chomsky's claims, as they are not falsifiable, while Sampson stresses:

> Our scientific knowledge is the totality of the guesses which we have put up for potential refutation and which we have not yet succeeded in refuting. All such knowledge is provisional. Even the best-established element of our knowledge might unexpectedly be refuted tomorrow, as Newton was by the eclipse observations. (1965, 21)

In that case, one has to live with an open mind, which is not bound to any particular worldview. Only such a mind can penetrate to the core of the nature of things. Post-structuralism, Multiculturalism and Anekanta recommend such a state of mind. Sampson writes:

> Ultimate, authoritative knowledge about matters of scientific fact is something that man can never hope to achieve. The search for scientific truth must always be an 'Unended Quest' to borrow the title of Popper's autobiography. The real world is so complicated that very likely none of our theories will ever be perfectly true, in which case each of them will be refuted sooner or later. But even if we did come up with a perfectly true theory in some domain, we could never know that we had achieved this. We would always be waiting to see whether a refutation was lurking round the next corner. (1965, 20)

This state of mind is ideal for the purpose of creating a peaceful and non-violent society. Anekanta is the foremost necessity to usher in peace and non-violence. Anekanta is the source of virtues and post-modernism and Anekantavada are the torchbearers of the new era of consciousness. Acharya Mahapragya rightly observes:

> The seeing eye of Anekanta is the best philosophical process with which one can understand the modes or the changes both gross and subtle, which occur in the material world. With this process, passions can be assuaged, conflicts can be resolved and the embers of rebellion can be appeased showing thus, the path to world peace. (2001, 29)

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

Acharya Mahaprajna. 2002. *Anekanta the Third Eye*. Ladnun: Jain Vishva Bharati Institute.

_____. 2001. *Anekanta: Reflections and Clarifications*. Ladnun: Jain Vishva Bharati Institute.

_____. 2001. *Anekanta: Views and Issues*. Ladnun: Jain Vishva Bharati Institute.

_____. 2000. *Quest for Truth*. Ladnun: Jain Vishva Bharati Institute.

Adams, M.V. 1996. *The Multicultural Imagination*: *Race, color, and the unconscious*. New York: Routledge.

Berry, Peter. 1999. *Beginning Theory*. Chennai: T.R. Publication Pvt. Ltd. by an arrangement with Manchester University Press.

Bhansali, C.R. *Lord Mahavira*. New Delhi: M & P Consultancy & Marketing Co., 2001. Print.

Coward, Harold. 1990. *Derrida and Indian Philosophy*. New York: State University of New York Press.

Curry, Mark. 2011. *Postmodern Narrative Theory* (Second Edition). London: Macmillan Palgrave.

Empson, William. 1965. *Seven Types of Ambiguity*. New York: New Directions.

Fox, Howard. 1989. *Essays on Postmodernism*. New York: Los Angeles County Museum of Art.

Hall, Donald (ed.). 1981. *The Oxford Book of American Literacy Anecdotes*. New York: OUP.

Harris, Thomas A. 1995. *Staying OK*. London: Arrow Books.

Hart, Kevin. 2004. *Postmodernism: A Beginner's Guide*. London: OUP.

Krishnaswamy, N. 2013. *An Introduction to India's Language Philosophy*. New Delhi: Pearson India. (Forthcoming)

Mudiya, Mahavir Singh. 1981. *Syadvad*. Churu: Adarsh Sahitya Sangh.

Narang, Gopichand. 2004. *Samrachnavad, Uttar-Samrchnavad evam Prachya Kavyashastra*. New Delhi: Sahitya Akademi.

Pragya, Samani Bhavit. 2000. *Jain View of Life*. New Delhi: Adarsh Sahitya Sangh.

Ramaswami, S, and V S Sethuraman. 2009. *The English Critical Tradition*, vol-1. New Delhi: Macmillan India.

Rattansi, Ali. 2011. *Multiculturalism: A Very Short Introduction*. New York: OUP.

Shah, Nagin. J. 2002. *Hemchandra's Praman Mimansa: A critique of Organ of Knowledge*. Ahmadabad: Gujrat Vidypeeth.

Sukla, Chandrashankar Pranshankar. *Jivan Me Syadvad*. n.p.: n.p.,n.d.

Tatia, Nathmal. 1994. *That Which Is*. New York: Harper Collins Publishers.

Thomas, F.1953. *Dynamics of Adjustment*. New York: MacMillan Co.

Tulsi, Acharya.1985. *Jain Siddhanta Dipika*. Translated by Satkari Mookerji. Ladnun: Jain Vishwa Bharati.

Tulsi, Ganadhipati. 1995. *Bhagavan Mahavira*. New Delhi: Pawan Printers.

Ward, Glen. 2003. *Postmodernism*. London: Hodder Education.